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THE GREEN COSTS OF KELO:
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
ILYASOMIN*
JONATHAN H. ADLER ••

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London
has rekfudled the debate over "economic development" takingscondemnations that transfer property from one private owner to another
solely on the ground that doing so might improve the local economy or
increase tax revenue. 1 While such takings have been condemned by many
commentators on both the right and the left, environmentalists have been
notably absent among Kelo's critics. Some environmentalists have even
defended the Kelo decision and the use of eminent domain to spur private
economic development. 2 At the same time, scholarly commentary on Kelo
and other economic development takings decisions has largely ignored
their potential environmental effects.
This Article provides the flrst detailed analysis of the environmental
effects of Kelo and economic development takings generally. It contends
that environmentalist support for economic development takings is
misguided, and that the rule embodied by the Supreme Court's Kelo
decision is bad for property owners and environmental protection alike.
There is a strong environmental rationale for strictly limiting or
prohibiting the use of eminent domain for economic development. 3

* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. Coauthor of amicus
curiae brief on behalf of the Institute for Justice and the Mackinac Center for Public Policy in County
of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004); author of amicus curiae brief on behalf of Jane
Jacobs inKelo v. City ofNew London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
** Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law; Visiting Senior Scholar, Mercatus Center, George Mason
University; B.A. (1991), Yale College; J.D. (2000), George Mason University School ofLaw.
For helpful suggestions and comments we would like to thank Susan Dudley, Steve Eagle, James Ely,
JonathanEntin, Andrew Morriss, Erich Rassbach, J.B. Ruhl, David Schnare, and Lior Strahilevitz.
Sharon Kim and Andrew Samtoy provided invaluable research assistance.
I. Kelo v. City ofNew London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
3. It should be noted at the outset that this paper does not contend that Kelo was wrongly
decided as a matter of constitutional law. The coauthors disagree on this point. In any event, limits on
the use of eminent domain for economic development need not come from federal courts. As discussed

623

624

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[VOL.

84:623

Keto's holding that economic development takings are a legitimate
public use under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause4 came shortly
after County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 5 in which the Michigan Supreme
Court overruled Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 6
which, at the· time, was the most famous earlier decision justifYing
economic development takings. 7• While it was not. the first decision
upholding economic development condemnations, 8 Poletown was by far
the most widely publicized and notorious. Public attention primarily
focused on the massive scale of Detroit's use. of eminent domain; under
the guise of economic development takings; Detroit destroyed an entire
neighborhood by condemning numerous businesses, churches;-- schools,
and the homes of some 4200 people. After condemnation, the land was
transferred to Geneta.l Motors for the construction of a new factory. 9
Like Poletown before it, Kelo was met withpublic outrage, despite the
fact that it arguably made few changes to existing federal Takings Clause

below, eleven state supreme courts have already banned economic development takings under state
constitutional law. See infra note 35. In the wake of Keto, many state legislatures also. began to
consider restrictions on the use of eminent domain. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, US. Supreme Court
Upholds Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development and Spurs a Firestorm of Legislative
Activity to Limit Such Authority; MUNICIPAL LAWYER, Summer 2005; see also Timothy Sandefur, The
"Backlash" So Far: Will Americans Get MeaningfUl Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 709 (2006) (showing that eminent domain reform efforts .face serious obstacles); llya Somin,
Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 64-84,. ..on file with authors), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 874865 (last visited Mar. 11, 2006) [hereinafter
Somin, Controlling] (discussing early post-Keto reforms); llya Somin, The Limits ofBacklash:
Assessing the Political Response to Kelo (Geo. Mason Univ. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 7-14,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.c;fm?abstract_id=976298 [hereinafter Somin,
Limits ofBacklash] (discussing reform in thirty-five states).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
5. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (holding that economic development takings are
unconstitutional).
_ ... -----6.~f'oletown-Neighborhood Gouncil-v"'Gity ofDetroit;-304-N,;:W:-2d-455-(Mich;-1981); overruled
by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
7. For a detailed discussion of Hathc.ock, 684 N.W.2d 765, see Ilya Somin, Overcoming
Poletov.in: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public
Use, 2004 MicH. ST. L.REv. 1005 (2004) [hereinafter Sornin, Overcoming Poletown] (symposium on
County of Wayne v. Hathcock). For evidence of Poletown's widespread notoriety, see JEANNIE
WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 110-38 (1989) (discussing publicity generated by Ralph
Nader's role in the case); Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra, at 1006--07.
8. See, e.g., Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 339 A.2d 278, 287-88 (Md.
1975) (holding that "industrial development" qualifies as a legitimate public use).
9. See Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1016-22 (discussing the impact of the
Poletown takings); Ilya Somin, Mich. Should Alter Property Grab Rules, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 8, 2004,
at llA [hereinafter Somin, Property Grab] (brief description of the facts and background of
Poletown).
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jurisprudence. 10 A striking feature of the reaction to Kelo, Poletown, and
Hathcock was the unusual political coalitions it fostered. 11 It is not
surprising that Kelo was denounced· and Hathcock cheered· by many
conservative and libertarian supporters of property rights. Indeed, the Kelo
property owners were represented by lawyers affiliated with the Institute
for ·Justice, a prominent libertarian public interest group. 12 Observers
unfamiliar with the history of economic development takings might be
more surprised to learn that an amicus brief supporting the property
owrtets ih. Kelo Wasllled" jointly·oy:-tlieNA:ACP~-ilie AARP, ana~tlie
Southern Christian Leadership Conference. 13 In Hathcock, pro-property
owner amicus briefs included filings by the Michigan branch of the
American Civil Liberties Union~ and left-wing activist and third~party
presidential candidate Ralph Nader.14 Nader had also been a prominent
opponent of the original Poletown condemnations in 1981. 15 One of the
present coauthors filed an amicus brief in support of the property owners

I 0. For detailed discussions of both Kelo~s relationship to precedent and the public backlash to
the decision, see Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 42-84, and Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra
note 3, at 1-14. See also Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain after kelo v. City of New London; An
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 497-98
(2006) ("[T]he Kelo decision was well grounded in history and case law, right or wrong .... ");
Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Emin(!nt Domain's Political Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 237, 283 (2006) ("[T]he only real difference between Ke/o and its noteworthy
predecessors, Berman and Midkiff, is that Kelo presented an economic development justification foreminent domain unadorned by more socially appealing purposes such as blight elimination or breaking
a land oligopoly."); Sandefur, supra note 3. Although Kelo may not represent a significant change in
eminent domain jurisprudence, there is some eVidence that the use of eminent domain increased after
the Supreme Court's decision. See Joyce Howard Price, Eminent Domain Surges After Ruling, WASH.
TIMES, June 21,2006, at A4 (reporting on apparent increase in use of eminent domain).
II. See infra nqtes 13-1;5 and accompanying text.
.
·
12. For general background on the Institute for Justice and other right-of-center public-interest
legal organizations, see Jonathan H. Adler, A Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy: It's Neither Vast nor a
Conspiracy. Discuss., LEGAL AFFAIRS, May/June 2005, at 62-{)5; see also BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE
PEOPLE: THE STORY OF THE FREEDOM-BASED PUBLIC INTEREST LAW MOVEMENT (Lee Edwards, ed.,
2005). For more background .on the Institute for Justice, see their website at http://www.ij.org. For
specific information on their handling of Kelo v. New London, see http://www.ij.org/private_property/
connecticut/index.html.
13. Brief for NAACP eta!. as AmiCi Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City ofNew London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057.
14. Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation & ACLU Fund of Michigan as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellants, County of Wayne v. Hatchcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (Nos. 124070124078), 2004 WL 687839; Brief for Ronald Reosti et al.·as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants,
County of Wayne v. Hatchcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (Nos. 124070-124078), aiJailable at
http://www .courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Cierk/04-04/124070-78/124070-124078-Arnicus.pd£
15. See WYLIE, supra note 7, at 110-51 (1989) (discussing Nader's role). For a more detailed
elaboration of Nader's views on economic development takings, see Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch,
Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REV. 207 (2004).
.
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in Kelo on behalf of Jane Jacobs, a prominent urban development theorist
normally associated with the political left. 16
Many left-of-center scholars and activists oppose economic
development takings because of their tendency to inflict disproportionate
harm on the poor and on ethnic minorities, often for the benefit of
corporate development interests. 17 After the Kelo decision was announced,
it was denounced by numerous liberal political leaders including former
President Bill Clinton; 18 Democratic National Committee Chair Howard
Dean, who blamed the result on a "Republican-appointed Supreme
Court;" 19 and California Representative Maxine Waters, a prominent
liberal African-American politician. 20
Environmentalists have been notably absent among Kelo's critics. The
American Farmland Trust was one of the few conservati6n organizations
to express concern in the immediate wake of the decision. 21 Most other
environmental groups stayed on the sidelines. 22 Moreover, s0me
prominent environmental lawyers actively supported the. City of New
London's arguments against judicial limitations on the use of eminent
domain. John D. Echeverria, executive director of the Georgetown
Environmentai Law & Policy Institute, collaborated on an amicus brief for
the American Planning Association defending the use of eminent domain
for economic development. 23 The Community Rights Counsel, a public
interest law firm focusing on environmental issues, filed an amicus brief in
support of New London on behalf of various local government'

16. Brief for Jane Jacobs as Arnica Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04~108); 2004 WL 2803191.
17. For more detailed discussion and citations, see Somin, Overcoming Po~etown, supra note 7,
at 1005-07; Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 18, 65.
18. See Erik Kriss, More Seek Curbs on Eminent Domain, SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD, July 31,
2005, at A16 (noting Clinton's opposition to the ruling).
19. See Howard Dean Comes to Utah to Discuss Politics (KSL TV television broadcast July 16,
2005);-·available ·at- http://tv:kstcom/index:php?nrd=39&s!d=2f922l-(Iasr:Visitea· Dec. 5, 2005)
(quoting Dean's remark denouncing "a Republican appointed [sic] Supreme Court that decided they
can take your house and put a Sheraton hdte!'in there").
20. See Charles Hurt, Congress Assails Domain Ruling, WASH. TIMES, July 1, :?005, at AI
(quoting Waters denouncing Kelo as "the most un-American thing that can be done").
21. See Supreme Court Ruling Has Implications for Private Landowners, FED. UPDATE (Am.
Farmland Trust, Washington, D.C.), July 7, 2005, http://www.farmland.org/programs/federal/Federal_
Updates/0702005.asp.
22. Among those environmental groups that fr~,;guently participate in environmental litigation
that neither participated in nor urged a given outcome in the Kelo case were the Natural Resources
Defense Council, Earthjustice, Environmental Defense, and Friends ofthe Earth.
23. Brief for the American Planning Association eta!. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), available at http://www.planning.
org/amicusbriefs/pdf/kelo.pdf.
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associations. 24 After the decision, Environmental Law Institute President
Leslie Carothers-wrote that limiting state and local governments' use of
eminent domain for economic development would have been .a "serious
setback" from "an environmental perspective." 25
J
Environmentalists have been suspicious of judicial protection . of
property rights under the Takings Clause because of the fear that it might
impede environmental regulation 26 and restrict the use of eminent domain
to_create ..public-parks . and-other-cenvironmental· amenities.-Wh-ateverthe
merits of this view with respect to other takings issues, 27 we contend that it
has virtually no relevance to judicial bans on "economic development"
takings. 28 More importantly, allowing such condemnations could actually
harm the environment in several ways. Conservationists and other
environmental advocates, we suggest, should support barring the use of
eminent domain for economic development.
Part I of this Article briefly explains the rationales of the Kelo and
Hathcock decisions and shows why a Hathcock-like ban on economic
development takings is highly unlikely to impede environmental
regulation or . threaten the use of eminent domain for .legitimate
conservation purposes. The doctrinal rules advocated by the Hathcock
24. Brief for the National League of Cities eta!. as Amici Curiae Supporting Responde~ts, Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), available at http://www.community
rights.org/PDFs/Briefs/Kelo.pdf. Community Rights Counsel (CRC) also labeled an early draft of this
paper the "outrage of the month" in their monthly newsletter, arguing that "voluntary sale of rural
lands for development poses a far greater threat to environmental quality than eminent domain." Xelo
v. the Environment: A Skewed View from the Libertarian Fringe, COMMUNITY RIGHTS REPORT
, (Community Rights Counsel, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2006, http://www.communityrights.org/PDFs/
' Newsletters/Apr2006.pdf.
25. Leslie Carothers, Strange Bedfellows in the Uproar Over the Kelo Case, ENvn. FORUM,
"Nov./Dec. 2005, at 56.
,
26. See. e.g., FRANK BOSSELMAN ET AL.; THE TAIGNG ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRNATELY-OWNED LAND
WITHOUT PAY1NG COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS iv (1973) ("[AJttempts to solve environmental
problems through land use regulation are threate.ned by the fear !hat they will be challenged ill court as
an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation.''); J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7
CONST. CoMMENT. 239 (1990); Jolm D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, "Perfectly Astounding" Public
,Rights: Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331 (2003); Joseph L. Sax,
Property Rights and the Economy ofNature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993); Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory "Takings": The Remarkable
Resurrection ofEconomic Substantive Due Process Analysis in Constitutional Law, 1? ENVTL. L. REP.
10,369 (1987); Joseph L. Sax, Tal,:ings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971);
Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Bills Threaten Private Property, People, and the Environment, 8
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 521 (1997).
27. For an overview of arguments that environmentalist suspicion of judicially protected property
rights is misguided, see Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Property Rights and
Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIDERTY 987 (2005).
28. See infra Part I.
.
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Court and the Kelo dissenters, and adopted by .courts in the eleven states
that ban economic development takings, 29 leave ample room for the use of
eminent domain to advance environmental goals. 30 This doctrinal point is
buttressed by empirical evidence indicating that none of the eleven states
with Hathcock-like bans on economic development takings have ever used ,
this rule to block condemnation of property for environmental or
conservation purposes. 31
·Part II shows that economic development takings may cause
environmental harm. Allowing the use of eminent domain for economic
development poses a particular danger to private conservation lands,
agricultural lands, and open space. 32 Because land owned by conservation
nonprofits produces few economic benefits and does not contribute to tax
revenue, it is likely to be targeted by developers and local governments
that use eminent · domain to advance ·their development interests. 33
Economic development takings can also harm the environment by
promoting environmentally harmful development, undermining property
rights,. and furthering . dubious development plans that sap community
wealth and reduce resources available for environmental protection. 34 In
many situations, economic development takings end up giving us the
worst ·of both worlds: they cause environmental harm and reduce
economic growth by transferring land to inefficient development projects.
I. WHY BANNING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS DOES NOT IMPEDE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

A ban on economic development takings does not threaten government
efforts to protect environmental values. This is readily demonstrated on
, the basis of both doctrinal analysis and empirical evidence from the eleven
states whose supreme courts have forbidden the economic development·
rationale. 35 None of these states have had successful , challenges to

29. See infra note 35.
30. See infra Part LA-B.
31. .See infra Part I. C.
32. See infra Part II.A:
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. See infra Part II.B.
35. The eleven states are Arkansas, Florida, lllinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington. See City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S. W.2d 486,
494-95 (Ark.1967) (private economic development project not a public use); Baycol, Inc. v.
DowntoWn Dev: Alith., 315 So.2d 451, 457 (Fl:i.. 1975)(holding that a "'public[econoinic] benefit' is
not synonymous with 'public purpose' as a predicate which can juStify eminent domain"); S'f. Ill.
Dev. Auth. v. Nat' I City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9-11 (Til. 2002) (holding that a "contribut[ion]
to positive economic growth in the region" is not a public use justifying condemnation), cert. denied,

\
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environmental regulations arise from their rulings on economic
development takings. 36 At the same time, public officials in these states
retain the power to use eminent domain for conservation purposes. 37
A. The Rationales ofKelo and Hathcock
The Kelo decision upheld economic development takings in a case that
arose from the con,demnation of ten residences and five other properties as
part of a 2000 development plan ill -New London, Connecticut, which
sought to transfer the property to private developers. 38 None of the
properties in question were alleged to be "blighted or otherwise in poor
condition. " 39 The condemnations were initiated under a plan prepared by
the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private, nonprofit
entity established "to assist the city council in economic development
planning."40 The city claimed the project would "provide appreciable
benefits to the community, including, but not limited to, new jobs and

537 U.S. 880 (2002); City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Ky. 1979) ("No 'public
use' is involved where the land of A is condemned merely to enable B to build a factory .... ")
(citation omitted); Opinion of the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 905--06 (Me. 1957) (holding that private
"industrial development" to enhance economy not a public use); Couoty of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (overruling Poletown and holding that economic development takings are
uoconstitutional); City of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1214-15 (Mont. 1995) (holding that a
condemnation that transfers property to a "private business" is uoconstitutional unless the transfer to
the business is "insignificant" and "incidental" to a public project); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853
N.E.2d 1115, 1140-41 (Ohio 2006) (following County of Wayne v. Hathcock in holding that
"economic development" alone does not justify condemnation); Bd. of Couoty Comm'rs of
Muskogee Couoty v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 642 (Okla. 2006) (holding that "economic development"
is not a "public purpose" uoder the Oklahoma Constitution); Ga. Dep't of Transp. v. Jasper Couoty,
586 S.E.2d 853, 856 (S.C. 2003) (holding that even a substantial "projected economic benefit" cannot
justify condemnation); Karesh v. City of Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (S.C. 1978) (striking down
taking justified only by economic development because such condemnations do not ensure "that the
public has an enforceable right to a definite and fixed use of the property" (quoting 29 C.J.S. Eminent
Domain § 31)); In re City of Seattle, 638 P.2d 549, 556-57 (Wash. 1981) (disallowing plan to use
eminent domain to build retail shopping where purpose was not elimination of blight); Hogue v. Port
of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171, 187 (Wash. 1959) (denying condemnation of residential property where
government sought to "devote it to what it considers a higher and better economic use"). In some of
these states, the wording of the state constitution restricts private-to-private condemnations much more
explicitly than does the Federal Takings Clause. See, e.g., Muskogee, 136 P.3d at 639, 651-52
(discussing differences between the wording of the Oklahoma Constitution and that of the Fifth
Amendment and using the distinction as justification for interpreting the state takings clause in a way
contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Takings Clause inKelo).
36. See infra Part LC.
37. See infra Part LC.
38. Kelo v. City ofNew London, 545 U.S. 469, 472-75 (2005).
39. /d. at 2659-60. For a discussion of the significance of "blight" designations for
condemnation, see infra Part LB.3.
40. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 495.

630

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

84:623

increased tax revenue." 41 Landowners challenged the condemnations on
the ground that such transfers from one private party to another were not
for a "public use" as required by the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 42
The constitutionality of the takings was upheld by the Supreme Court of
Connecticut in a 4-3 decision. 43 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in an
unexpectedly close 5-4 decision. 44
The rriajority opinion by Justice Stevens focused on the alleged need to
maintain the Court's ·"policy of deference to legislative judgment" on
public use issues. 45 It refused to accept the property owners' argument that
the transfer of their property to private developers, rather than to a public
body, required a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny. 46 The Court also
refused to require the city to provide any evidence that .the takings were
likely to achieve the clain:J.ed economic benefits which justified them in the
first place. 47 On all these matters, the Kelo majority chose not to "secondguess the City's considered judgments about the efficacy of the
development plan. " 48
The I{.elo Court would uphold almost any economic development
takings that arises from "an integrated development 'plan." 49 This
approach, while slightly less deferential than earlier Supreme Court public
use decisions, 50 still provides little protection for property owners.
Virtually any condemnation can be legitimized by a plan of some kindespecially if the Court continues to refuse to "second-guess" the plan's
rationale and efficacy. 51
.
.
The Michigan Supreme Court's decision in County of. Wayne v.
Hathcock addressed the same issue as Kelo, but under the Michigan,
Constitution's takings clause rather than the federal one. 52 Overruling

41. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469-70.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
43. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), ajf'd 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
- ----A4:--Ke/o;-545-U:S~at-469:-The·closeness-of-the-outcome· was-unex:pecfed- because-the-Supreme
Court had-almost completely eliminated public use restrictions on takings in previous decisions. See
Somin, Property Grab, supra note 9, at 42-55; see generally supra note 10.
45. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
46. Id. at 487-88.
47. !d.
48. Id. at 488
49. Id. at 487.
50. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3 (explaining why Kelo is marginally less deferential to
the government than earlier decisions such as Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) and Hawaii
Housing Auth. v. Midkijf,467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
51. Kelo, 545 U;S; at 488.
52. MICH. CaNST. art. 10, § 2. The wording of the Michigan state takings clause is actually very
similar to that of the Federal Constitution. Compare id. ("Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a matter prescribed by law."),
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Pdletown, 53 Hathcock forbade economic development takings. 54 Hathcock
and other decisions striking down the economic development rationale fall
slJ_ort, however, of a complete ban on private-to-private condemnations. In
Hathcock, for example, the Michigan Supreme Court laid out three
scenarios in which private-to-private takings will still be upheld:
1. where "public necessity of the extreme sort" requires collective
. action;
·- ----- __ :-:1__ --2. where the property remains subject to public oversight after
transfer to a private entity; and
. 3. where the property is selected because of "facts of independent
public significance" rather than the interests of the private entity to
which the property is eventually transferred. 55
These three· categories, especially the latter two, have been replicated in
other states that forbid economic development takings. 56 Even more
importantly, neither Hathcock nor other decisions limiting the use of
eminent domain for economic development forbid condemnations where
the property is to be transferred to government ownership or to a private
owner-such as a public utility or common carrier-that is legally
required to allow the public to access or use the property. 57 As a result,
public officials in these states retain ample means of advancing
conservation objectives, including the use of eminent domain. Prohibiting
the use of eminent domain for economic development does not foreclose
. its use for other purposes, including environmental protection.

and U.s: CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
53. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled
by County of Wayne v. Hathcock; 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
54. County of Wayne v. Hathcock; 684 N.W.2d 765, 779-86 (Mich. 2004).
55. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (quoting Poletowil Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,
304 N.W.2d 455, 478-80 (Ryan, J., dissenting)). The Hathcock court itself did not originate the three
exceptions but consciously borrowed them from Justice Ryan's Poletown dissent. See Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d. at 780-83 (relying extensively onPoletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478-80 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
56. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 85-88 (noting parallels in other states).
57.· See, e.g., Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782 (noting that private-to-private takings are allowed if
the property "will be devoted to the uSe of the public, independent of the will of the corporation taking
· it") (citations omitted).
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B. Doctrinal Analysis
Straightforward doctrinal analysis readily shows why bans on
economic development takings do not forbid condemnation proceedings or
regulation undertaken for purposes of environmental protection and
· conservation. In other words, very few if any legitimate environmental
uses of eminent domain are threatened by the Hathcock rule.

I. Government Ownership
Perhaps the most important reason why a rejection of Kelo would not
imperil environmental protection is that a ban on economic development
takings would not forbid condemnations that transfer property to
government ownership. This point is universally acknowledged by state
courts that ban economic development takings 58 and also by the U.S.
Supreme Court dissenters in Kelo. 59 As Justice O'Connor notes in the lead
dissent, the state's power to condemn "private property" in order to
transfer it to "public ownership" is "relatively straightforward and
uncontroversial. " 60
This long-established power encompasses the vast bulk of
environmentally-related condemnations. If the government condemns land
in order to establish a state or national park, create a wildlife refuge,
preserve open space, or acquire valuable natural resources, such a
condemnation could not be invalidated provided that the land was
transferred to public ownership. Similarly, should a local government
condemn a right-of-way for the construction of a government-owned mass
transit line, public ownership of the right-of-way would authorize the use
of eminent domain for such purposes. This fact should allay the most
prominent environmental concerns about potential limits on eminent
domain.
The same point applies to_ most, if not all, e:qvironmental regulatory
takings. Even if one assumes that environmentaC regulations restricting
development or potentially harmfui land uses are tantamount to the seizure
of private property, barring the use of. eminent domain for economic
development would not limit the state's regulatory power. So long as the
rights condemned by the regulation are not transferred to other private

58. See cases cited in supra note 35, none of which extend the ban on economic development
takings to takings for public ownership.
59. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 497 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
60. !d.
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parties, they are retained by the government-even if held in the public
trust and not actually used-and therefore cannot be considered private-toprivate takings. As with any other use of eminent domain, the government
would have to compensate the landowner. for the taking of the land, but
this requirement is separate from the question of whether a given
regulatory action constitutes a taking for "public use." For example, if the
government restricts the development of privateJand in order to prevent
environmental degradation, _:-the aggrieve.d . landowner may seek
compensation for the "taking," 61 but the action could not be challenged as
a violation of state or federal public use clauses so long as the government
did not transfer the development rights in question to another private
owner. Some would contend that such regulations should not be
considered takings at all, 62 but that issue is separate from the question of
whether the regulations, assuming that they are takings, can be invalidated
for lack of a "public use." Under the reasoning of Hathcock and the Kelo
dissenters, they could not be.

2. Private Ownership with Legally Mandated Public Access
Bans on economic development takings still permit condemnations for
transfer to government ownership and those that "transfer private property
to private parties, often common carriers, who make the property available
for the public's use-such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a
stadium." 63 Even Justice. Thomas's. dissent in Kelo, which takes the most
restrictive view of public use of any of the nine Supreme Court justices,
acknowledges that private-to-private condemnations are constitutional if
"the public has a legal right to use ... the property." 64
In the environmental context, this means that the government could use
private-to-private condemnations to promote environmental goals so long
as the new private owners are required to give the general public a legal
· right of access. For example, the government could condemn property for
transfer to a privately owned park or nature preserve so long as the new
owners are legally required to provide access to the public. The same
reasoning· would protect the use of eminent domain to facilitate the
construction of privately run rail lines or other forms of environi:nentally

61. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
62. See, e.g., supra note 26 and sources cited therein.
63. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O'Connor, 1., dissen.ting); id. at 508 (Thomas, 1., dissenting) (noting
that private-to-private condemnations are acceptable if "the public has a legal right to use[] the
property."); see also County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765,782 (Mich. 2004) (same).
64. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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desirable transit infrastructure. 65 Such access would not have to be free of
charge or restrictive conditions. As in the case of public utilities and
common carriers, the owners of privately owned environmental amenities
would merely have to guarantee access to all members of the public
willing to pay a set fee and obey relevant rules.

3. The Hathcock Exceptions
The Hathcock decision outlined three additional exceptions to its ban
on private-to-private takings: cases of "extreme public necessity,"
situations where the condemn·ed property remained subject to "public
control," and, most importantly, instances where the condemnation was
justified by facts of "independent public significance." 66 In this last
scenario, which includes cases of blight, "the act of condemnation itself,
rather than the use to which the condemned land eventually would be put,
... [is the] public use" justifying condemnation. 67 For that reason, the
danger of abuse on behalf of private interest groups is reduced, because it
allegedly does not matter what the new owners of the property do with it
so long as the old, harmful uses of the condemned land are mitigated or
eliminated. On this basis, it is likely that governments could condemn land
to eliminate environmental harms. 68
The paradigmatic example of this type of scenario is the removal of
"urban blight for the sake of public health and safety." 69• Forty-six of the
fifty states, including ten of the eleven that forbid economic development
takings, 70 have statutes that permit condemnation of blighted property for
redevelopment purposes. 71 The Hathcock justification of blight

65. Indeed, the Keto dissenters acknowledged the legitimacy of using eminent domain to
facilitate the operations of "common carriers" including railroads. See Keto, 545 U.S. at 498
(O·'Connor, J., dissenting).
66. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783.
67. Id.
68. It is .worth emphasizing that state and local governments retain many other means of
addressing harmful land uses and blight beyond the exercise of eminent domain, including land-use·
regulations and public nuisance actions.
69. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (citing Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455,478-79 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissen1ing)).
70. See cases cited in supra note 35.
71. Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 391 (2000); Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3, at 30. The four
exceptions are Utah, Florida, Nevada, and North Dakota, all of which recently forbade both blight and
economic development condemnations by statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 1713-4-202 (Supp. 2005)
(outlining powers of redevelopment agencies and omitting the power to use eminent domain for blight
alleviation or development); FLA. STAT. § 73.014(2) (enacted 2006) (requiring that condemning
authorities "may not exercise the power of eminent domain to take private property for the purpose of
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condemnations was also endorsed by Justice O'Connor in the principal
Kelo dissent. 72 As 0' Connor explains, with blight condemnations, "a
public purpose [is] realized when the hann:ful [blight is] eliminated.
Because each taking directly achieve[s] a public benefit, it [does] not
matter that the property was turned over to private use." 73 Justice
Thomas's solo dissent in Kelo is 'the only noteworthy modem judicial
opinion that even comes close to advocating judicial invalidation of blight
condemnations.74- ~~· Condemnations that are intended to eliminate sources of pollution or to
alleviate other kinds of environmental damage could easily be justified on
exactly the same reasoning as blight condemnations; the sole difference
between the two is that the latter seek to eliminate dangerous or
dilapidated structures, while the former target environmental risks. In both
situations "the act of condemnation itself, rather than the use to which the
condemned land eventually would be put, [is the] public use" justifying
condemnation. 75 Indeed, some of the harms used to justify blight
condemnations are in fact environmental in nature, including the "spread
[of] disease" 76 and "health hazards" such as "hazardous waste sites, trash,
vermin, or fire hazards." 77 Similar rationales could be used to condemn
abandoned industrial properties or urban brownfields in order to facilitate
their containment or cleanup. 78
Blight condemnations are hardly unproblematic. Historically, they have
often been used to displace poor or minority populations for the benefit of
white middle- or upper-class interests. 79 Since World War II, up to four

preventing or eliminating slum or blight conditions"); see also Henry Lamb, Utah Bans Eminent
Domain Use by Redevelopment Agencies, ENV'T & CLIMATE NEWS, June I, 2005,
http://www.heartland.org/article.cfrn?artiD=17162 (describing the politics behind the Utah law). For
discussion of the Nevada and North Dakota Jaws, enacted by referendum initiatives in November
2006, see Somin, Limits ofBacklash, supra note 3, at 30.
72. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 500 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(endorsing the Supreme Court's decision to allow blight condemnations in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954)).
73. Id.
74. See id. at 519-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Berman should perhaps be
overruled).
75. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783 (Mich. 2004).
76. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
77. Luce, supra note 71, at 395 (noting that fifty-two of fifty-four U.S. jurisdictions include such
"health hazards" as part of the definition of blight).
78. See Hope Whitney, Cities and Superfund: Encouraging Brownfield Redevelopment, 30
ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 69-70 (2003) (discussing use of eminent domain in brownfieldredevelopment).
79. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1.(2003) (providing extensive discussion of the
history ofblight condemnations and the hapns they cause); Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 91-94
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million people have been dispossessed in this way. 80 Postwar urban
renewal condemnations were so notorious for targeting African-Americans
that "[i]n cities across the country, urban renewal came to be known as
'Negro removal. "' 81
Furthermore,· some states define blight so broadly that almost any
property becomes vulnerable to condemnation as a result. Recent court
decisions have upheld blight condemnations in such affluent areas as New
York City's Times Square and downtown Las Vegas. 82 Even some
defenders of eminent domain acknowledge that blight designations are
subject to occasional abuse. ~3 For present purposes, however, the point at
issue is not the possibility that the blight exception is too broad and has the
potential for abuse, but the potential danger that it is too narrow to allow
for condemnations intended to eliminate environmental harms. Under
present case law, any such concern is severely misplaced.
The implications of Hathcock's other two exceptions for environmental
takings are more difficult to determine because their scope remains unclear
as qf this writing. 84 The exception for "public necessity of the extreme
sort" 85 could potentially be used to justify private-to-private
condemnations that eliminate major environmental threats, especially if
there is no other way to address them. 86 Similarly, the "public control"
exception could be used to defend private-to-private environmental
condemnations "where the property remains subject to public oversight," 87
as might occur where eminent domain is used to condemn conservation
easements or rights-of-way across private land. However, the scope of this
exemption is difficult to predict because the Hathcock court failed to

(same); Sornin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1035-38 (citing sources and evidence).
80. Sornin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1037.
81. Pritchett supra note 79, at 4 7.
82. Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1034 (discussing City of Las Vegas
Do\Yiltown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 12-15 (Nev. 200~); cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1603
(2004); W. 41st St. Realty, LLC v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div.
2002)); see also Ilya Sornin, Blight Sweet Blight, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 14, 2006, at 33 (discussing use
of extremely broad blight standards to condemn nondilapidated properties).
83. See INT'L ECON. DEY. COUNCIL, EMINENT DOMAIN RESOURCE KIT 8, http://www.iedconline.
org/Downloads/Erninent_Domain_Kit.pdf.
84. See Sornin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1028-33 (noting ambiguity and
discussing possible conflicting interpretations).
85. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783 (Mich. 2004).
86. The Hathcock court suggests that this exception may only apply if the public project in
question "requires collective action" through eminent domain in order to acquire the land necessary to
carry it out. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783. In many, if not most, instances, local governments will
have alternatives to the use of eminent domain to address blight and other nuisance-causing land
conditions.
87. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783.
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explain how. much "public control" is enough to justify an otherwise
invalid taking. 88
Even if the first and second Hathcock exceptions turn out to provide
little or no protection to environmental takings, this result would have very
limited significance. Virtually any environmental taking or regulation
could be justified by rules permitting takings for government ownership,
for private entities that allow the public a legal right of access, and those
intended to alleviate bliglit and analogous harms.
- --Some environmentalists and advocates of economic development
takings contend that eminent domain can be used to advance
environmental protection by encouraging infill and the redevelopment of
older urban areas as an alternative to urban sprawl. 89 In some instances,
eminent domain may be the easiest way to assemble the large, contiguous
land parcels necessary to make dense urban redevelopment economically
viable. In addition, some fear that limiting or prohibiting economic
development takings would prevent the use of eminent domain for
environmentally beneficial projects.
It is certainly possible that restricting the use of eminent domain for
economic development could impede some environmentally desirable
projects. In our view, however, ·such concerns are greatly overstated, if not
completely unwarranted. First, many urban redevelopment projects could
still proceed under one or more of the Hathcock exceptions. Much urban
development is planiJ.ed for areas that could qualify for a blight
designation. In other instances, eminent domain might be permitted insofar
as it addresses. a public necessity of the extreme sort, beyond the potential
economic value of the development itself. 90
'Where a project does not qualify under these exceptions, there is good
reason to question the need for eminent domain at all. While eminent
domain can be used to overcome holdout problems in the assembly of
large land parcels, there are numerous private sector tools to overcome

88. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783-83; see also Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at
1031 (discussing this ambiguity).
89. See, e.g., Harold Brodsky, Land Development and the Expanding City; 63 ANNALS AsS'N
AM. GEOGRAPHERS 159, 163-66 (1973) (arguing that the power of eminent domain should be used to
promote urban development, thereby preventing sprawl); Carothers, supra note 25; Echeverria &
Lurman, supra note 26; Thomas W. Merrill, The Misplaced Flight to Substance, 19 PROB. & PROP. 16,
19-20 (2005) (arguing that economic development takings might be used to prevent "sprawl"); cf
Herman G. Berkman, Decentralization and Blighted Vacant Land, 32 LAND ECON. 270, 279-80
(1956) (arguing that the government should make more urban land available for development in order
to prevent harmful sprawl); Charles Siemon, Who Bears the Cost? LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1987, at 115, 125-26 (same).
90. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783.
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such problems without the use of eminent domain. 91 Where these are
ineffective, it is highly likely that the reason for failure is the fact that the
current uses of the property in question are more valuable to society than
those planned by the developers who seek to acquire it. 92
It is also iinportant to separate the theoretical environmental benefits of
the widespread use of eminent domain from the practical reality of how
eminent domain is used by government agencies. Where government
officials are authorized to condemn property for economic development,
they become subject to substantial interest group pressures to approve
projects that benefit parochial private interests, such as commercial
developers, at the expense of the general public. 93 While it is theoretically
possible that urban redevelopment projects would be undertaken with
environmental values in mind, this does not appear to be the actual
practice where private property is taken for economic development
purposes. 94 For this reason, there are very few, if any, instances where
economic development takings have significantly advanced environmental
protection. 95 Even insofar as such examples exist, the environmental
benefits of such projects must be weighed against the significant
environmental risks posed by permitting economic development takings
generally. 96 Moreover, in the rare cases where an economic development
condemnation might create environmental benefits, it is likely that it could
be justified under one of the rationales described above. Consequently,
environmental benefits could be created without legitimizing the economic
development rationale in the vast number of cases where condemnations
either do not advance environmental values or actually cause
environmental harms.

91. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public. Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influences, 92 Cornell L. Rev. I, 18-30 (2006).
(discussing effective private sector alternatives to eminent domain); So min, Controlling, supra note 3,
at 21~29 (same).
_92. See Kelly, supra note 91; Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 24--27.
93. For a detailed discussion, see Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 8-23.
94. Even proponents of the use of eminent domain for economic development rarely highlight
the land conservation or environmental benefits of eminent domain projects. See, e.g., INT'L EcoN.
DEV. COUNCIL, supra note 83.
95. See id. at 29 (tangentially noting alleged environmental benefits of one of seven projects
selected for case studies of the successful use of eminent domain).
96. See infra Part II.
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C. Empirical Evidence from States that Have Banned Economic

Development Takings

The conclusion drawn from the above doctrinal analysis is bolstered by
,empirical evidence from the eleven states whose supreme courts have
banned economic development takings. Despite the lack of doctrinal
support for the notion, a ban on economic development takings could
theoretically lead to restrictions-on environmental -takings through some
sort of slippery slope process. 97 In practice, any such possibility remains
purely theoretical.
State supreme courts that ban economic development takings include
Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington. 98 Two other state supreme
courts, those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, significantly restrict
them without imposing a categorical ban. 99 While some of these decisions,
including the 2004 Hathcock case, are recent, 100 others are oflongstanding
vintage. For example, Maine rejected the economic development rationale
in 1957, Washington in 1959, Arkansas in 1967, Florida in 1975, South
Carolina in 1978, and Kentucky in 1979. 101 More than enough time has

97. See generally Eugene Volokh, Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1026
(2003). One possible slippery slope mechanism that could lead to restrictions on environmental takings
might be an argument that some environmental condemnations only benefit specific private
individuals rather than the general public. For example, neighboring property owners may benefit
disproportionately from the condemnation of a conservation easement across another landowner's
property.
· 98. See infra notes 100-01 and cases cited therein.
' 99. See Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 561 (Mass. 1969) (holding that economic
benefits of a proposed stadium were not enough of a public use to j1Jstif)' condemnation); Merrill v.
City of Manchester, 499 A.2d 216,217-18 (N.H. 1985) (holding that condemnation for industrial park
was not a public use where no harmful condition was being e!in:iinated).
100. For example, Oklahoma only forbade economic development takings in 2006, Illinois in
2002, and Montana in 1995. See Sw. ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'! City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d I, 9-11 (Ill.
2002) (holding that a "contribut[ion] to economic growth in the region" .is not a public use justifYing
condemnation); City of Bozeman v. Vanirnan, 898 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Mont. 1995) (holding that a
condemnation that transfers property to a "private business" is unconstitutional unless the transfer to
the business is "insignificant" and "incidental" to a public project); Bd. of County Comm'rs of
Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 647-52 (Okla. 2006) (holding that "economic
development" is not a "public purpose" under the Oklahoma state constitution).
101. See City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 494-95 (Ark. 1967) (holding that a
private economic development project was not a public use); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth.,
315 So.2d 451, 457 (Fla. 1975) (holding that "'public [economic] benefit' is not synonymous with
'public purpose' as a predicate which can justifY eminent domain"); City of Owensboro v.
McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Ky. 1979) ("No 'public use' is involved where the land of A is
condemned merely to enable B to build a factory."); Opinion of the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 905-06
(Me. 1957) (holding that "industrial development" is not a public use); Karesh v. City of Charleston,
247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (S.C. 1978) (striking down taking justified only by economic development);
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passed to give courts in these states an opportunity to use the ban on
economic development takings to restrict environmental condemnations or
regulations, should they be so inclined. Strikingly, there is not even one
published opinion in any of these states that has actually done so. 102 The
same holds true for Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the two states
whose high courts place major restrictions on economic development
takings without completely banning them.
Only one published decision comes close to striking down an
environmental taking on public use grounds in any of the states that ban or
restrict the economic development rationale. In 1974, the Maine Supreme
Court invalidated a taking intended to promote tb,e scenic beauty of areas
adjacent to state highways. 103 Yet the court aclrnowledged that "the ,
restoration, preservation and enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to
public highways is a public use," 104 and only invalidated the taking at
issue because the condemnation in question was "unreasonable and an
abuse of power" under the terms of the Maine statute hi question, as
interp_reted in light of state constitutional requirements. 105 Whatever the
merits of this decision, it had no connection to the state's ban on economic
development takings. By contrast, at least one decision from the relevant
states explicitly upheld private-to-private environmental takings against a
public use challenge, even after the state supreme court had banned
economic development takings. 106 Other decisions from these states have
also noted that environmental protection is a recognized public use. 107
It is noteworthy that the states analyzed here are ideologically and
economically diverse. They include conservative states such as Kentucky
and South Carolina, liberal states such as Washir!gton and Michigan, and

Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171, 187 (Wash. 1959) (denying condemnation of residential
property when justification for condemnation was the government's desire to "devote it to what it
considers a higher and better economic use").
102. There are also no unpublished opinions reaching such a conclusion in the Westlaw and Lexis
databases for any of the eleven states. However, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that
there are unpublished opinions that have not been recorded in an electronic database. Obviously, the
precedential impact of any such opinions is likely to be extremely small at best.
103. Finks v. Me. State Highway Cornrn'n, 328 A.2d 191, 800 (Me. 1974).
104. !d. at 794 (quoting Wes Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Goldberg, 262 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 1970)).
105. !d. at 799-800.
106. See Hallauer v. Spectrum Props., Inc., 18 P.3d 540, 541 (Wash. 2001) (upholding private-toprivate condemnation intended to divert water for purposes of "domestic use, and to ponds for fish
propagation").
107. See, e.g., Pfeifer v. City of Little Rock, 57 ScW.3d 714, 716 (Ark. 2001) (affirming
condemnation of private property for creation of a park associated with the Clinton Presidential
Library); In re City of Long Beach, 82 P.3d 259,263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding condemnation
of private property for recreational trail).
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more centrist states such as Florida and Illinois. Further, they include both
agricultural states, such as Montana and Kentucky, and more
industrialized ones such as Michigan and Illinois. However, none of these
states' courts have reached the sorts of results that environmentalists might
fear. While we cannot prove with absolute certainty that there would be no
restrictions on environmental regulation or various· conservation measures
if a ban on economic development takings were adopted by other states or
by the United State§ Supreme Cmui, the available evidence suggests that
any such restrictions are highly unlikely.
II. HOW ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS THREATEN
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM

Prohibitions on the use of eminent domain for economic development
do not hamper environmental protection efforts. Allowing such use of
eminent domain, on the other hand, poses significant environmental risks,
particularly to private land conservation. If state and local governments are
allowed to use eminent domain to promote development, facilitate private
industry, and expand the local tax base, it is likely that some
condemnations will target conservation land and open space, including
property owned by land trusts or otherwise protected with conservation
easements. 108 Insofar as eminent domain is used to subsidize industrial or
commercial development, it further threatens environmental harm,
particularly where such development displaces land uses that have less
intense environmental impacts. Encouraging inefficient land uses and
excessive development has the potential to increase the environmental
impacts of economic activity.
Limiting the use of eminent domain for economic development will not
end all environmentally harmful uses of eminent domain. Such a rule
would still allow governments to condemn conservation lands for publicly
owned projects, 109 and would not prevent the use of overbroad blight
. designations to condemn undeveloped land. 110 Eminent domain would also

108. See infra Part II.A.
109. For example, in December 2005, officials in Willacy County, Texas, announced plans to
con!femn a 1500-acre natore preserve on South Padre Island owned by The Natore Conservancy to
construct a ferry landing. See James Pinkerton, Nature Area's Fut"are Sha!..y, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec.
18,.2005; see also Carter Smith, South Padre Island Preserve Deserves Our Protection, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 27, 2005. The proposed use of the land, a public ferry landing designed to increase
public access to the beaches on South Padre Island, would likely remain permissible if economic
development takings were prohibited.
110. See, e.g., Jim Herron Zamora, Lockyer Challenges Seizure of Land for Private Project, S.F.
CHRON., July 27, 2005, at B8; see also Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 89-91 (discussing
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remain available for the construction of roads and infrastructure that
facilitate the development of previously undeveloped lands. Nonetheless,·
the proposed rule can still do much to limit the environmental costs of
eminent domain, even if it cannot completely eliminate them.
A. The Threat to Private Land Conservation

Private conservation efforts in the United States date back over one
hundred years. 111 Environmental organizations, such as the National
Audubon Society, trace their roots to early efforts to protect species
habitat and other resources through the use of private property rights. 112
Today, private conservation plays an ever-increasing and indispensable
role in environmental protection. 113 "Leaving rural land protection in the
hands of counties and states would consign most of the wildlife habitat in
the nation to oblivion," warns Dana Beach of the South Carolina Coastal
Conservation League. 114 Land trusts and other private organizations
"promote a level of innovation and experimentation in private land
conservation efforts that typically is not found in government controlled
land conservation programs." 115 Insofar as eminent domain can be used to
force the development of previously undeveloped land, it poses a: threat to
the vitality of such conservation efforts, particularly those undertaken by
nonprofits or politically unpopular organizations. The former are

increasing use of very broad definitions of blight that could encompass almost any property).
Ill. Dominic P. Parker, Land Trusts and the Choice to Conserve Land with Full Ownership or
Conservation Easements, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 483, 486 (2004) (citing Gordon Abbot, Jr., Historic
Origins, in PRIVATE OPTIONS: TOOLS AND CONCEPTS FOR LAND CONSERVATION 150, 150-52
(Barbara Rushmore eta!. eds.;~l982)).
112. See generally FRANK GRAHAM JR., THE AUDUBON ARK: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
AUDUBON SOCIETY (1990).
113. See Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, Why Environmental Lawyers Should Know
(and Care) About Land Trusts and Th'eir Private Land Conservation Transactions, 34 ENVTL. L. REP.
I 0,223, I 0,231 (2004)(iioting that coiiservationeasemenfs "feguhirly result[] ill a level of land use
control that private landowners would never tolerate through regulation"); Adam E. Draper, Comment,
Conservation Easements: Now More than Ever-Overcoming Obstacles to Protect Private Lands, 34
ENVTL. L. 247, 252 (2004) ("Protecting and conserving private land has become increasingly important
as a rural lifestyle supported by an urban income has become the new American dream."); Nancy A.
McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 453,459 (2002) [hereinafter Role ofLand Trusts] (noting the "increasing recognition of the need
for non-regulatory approaches to private land conservation"); see also Council on Environmental
Quality, Special Report: The Public Benefits of Private Conservation, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
363 (1984) (documenting importance of private conservation).
114. Dana Beach, Create More Incentives for Easements, OPEN SPACE, Summer 2004, at 13.
l15. Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 113, at 10,233; see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Providing Biodiversity Through Policy Diversity, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 355,376 (2002).
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vulnerable to economic development takings because they do not produce
tax revenue, and the latter because of their political wealrness.

1. Private Land Conservation and Economic Development Takings

Econ~mic development takings pose a particular threat to privately
owned undeveloped lands. Such lands rarely generate significant tax
revenue, nor are they ~Q1lfC~S of job growth. Large, undeveloped-land
parcels may also be particularly appealing to developers and local
government officials, 116 which makes conservation lands frequent targets
of eminent domain. 117 Palm Springs, California, for example, used
eminent domain to take thirty acres of land bequeathed as a wildlife
preserve in order to build a golf course. 118 The city even sought to avoid
paying for the land, but lost in court and was forced to pay $1.2 million. 119
In New Jersey, Citgo Petroleum offered to give Petty's Island in the
Delaware River to the state as a nature preserve. 120 The site was once used
by the company, but is now home to many animal species, including
121
herons, egrets, and at least one pair of nesting bald eagles. The regional
office of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service supported the
move, 122 but Pennsauken Township had other ideas. It sought to condemn
the property and turn it over to residential development. 123
116. An important part of the appeal of larger, undeveloped parcels is that, other things being
equal, the transaction costs of assembling a large lot for redevelopment will be lower the smaller the
number of parcels that need to be acquired. Moreover, fewer parcels mean fewer landowners with
whom developers must negotiate or against whom local gove=ents must initiate eminent domain
proc,eedings.
11-7. See, e.g., Johnston v. Sonoma County Agric. & Open Space Dist., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 226,
238-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (easement for wastewater pipeline across land protected by conservation
easement was obtained involuntarily through threat of eminent domain); Christian Berthelsen, Group
Battles Toll Road with Prayer, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 21, 2006, at B3 (conservation easement
threatened by proposed highway expansion); Carter Smith, Editorial, South Padre Island Faces
Eminent Threat, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 31, 2005, at liB (eminent domain sought
against 1500-acre nature preserve); Debbie Swartz, 100 Residents Attend Hearing on Gas Pipeline,
PRESS & SUN-BULL. (Binghamton, N.Y.), Apr. 5, 2006, at IB (eminent domain proposed for
construction of natural gas pipeline through nature preserve).
•118. Marie Leech, $1.2 Million Agreement Ends 10-Year Land Feud, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs,
Cal.), Sept. 30, 2001, at lB.
119. See City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999); Leech, supra note 118, at lB.
120. Bernie Mixon, Petty's Island Tug of War Looms, COURIER-POST (Cherry Hill, N.J.), June 30,
2004, available at http://www .courierpostonline.corn!pennsaukenprornise/m063004y.htrn.
121. Id.
122. Elisa Ung, Let Petty's Be a Park, U.S. Urges, PHil-A. INQUIRER, Mar. 10, 2006, at B5.
123. Stacie Babula, New Jersey Politics Flare in Scujjle Over Delaware River Island,
BLOOMBERG NEWS SERVICE, July 28, 2005; Mixon, supra note 120.
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Agricultural land is also threatened. In the wake of the Kelo decision,
American Farmland ·Trust President Ralph Grossi warned, "[w]ith so
much farmland on the urban edge and near cities still in steep decline, exurban towns could be tempted by this ruling to make farmland available
for subdivisioi:ts." 124 The American Farm Bureau Federation contends that
the "sparsely developed lands of farmers and ranchers are particularly
vulnerable" to the use of eminent domain for economic development
purpoSes, such as ·increasing the local tax base. 125 As the Federation
explained in its amicus curiae brief in Kelo, "it will often be the case that
more intense development. by other private individuals or entities for other
private purposes would yield greater tax revenue to local government." 126
Local governments frequently seek to use eminent domain to facilit;:tte
the industrial development of farmland. Bristol, Connecticut, for example,
condemned a thirty-two-acre tree farm for the creation of an industrial
park, an action Connecticut courts upheld as a "public use." 127 In
Kingston, Tennessee, Roane County officials sought to condemn seven
128
f~¥IDS covering 655 acres for an industrial park.
Hartford, Connecticut,
used eminent domain to take a mostly wooded parcel of land in an effort
to keep a local manufacturing facility. 129 In New York, the Onondaga
County Industrial Development Authority sought to obtain 245 acres of
farmland for residential, commercial, and industrial growth, including
semiconductor fabrication plants, and was willing to use eminent domain
if necessary to assemble the lots for development. 130 In Greene County,
Missouri, local officials sought to condemn a dairy farm in order to create
a new industrial park. 131 The condemnation was justified by the city

124. See Supreme Court Ruling Has Implications for Private Landowners, supra note 21.
125. Brief for American Farm Bureau Federation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at
3, Kelo v. City ofNew London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108).
126. See id.
127. DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POW:ER,PRIVATEGAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE~BYcSTATE REPORT
ExAMINING THE ABUSE ClF EMINENT DOMAIN 46 (2003); see also 'sugryn v. City of Bristol, 774 A.2d
1042 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
128. Randy Kenner, 'It's My Home, ' Roane Landowner Says: County Wants Property for
Industrial Park, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, July 25, 1999, at Bl. When challenged in court, the
condemnation was declared a "public use," but was overturned on other legal grounds. See Roane
County v. Christmas Lumber Co., No. E1999-00370-COA-R9-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2000).
129. Maryellen Fillo, Fighting for the Land: Family Battle for Farm Ownership, HARTFORD
COURANT, Oct. 17, 1999, at Bl.
130. John Doherty, Clay, Cicero Parcels Tempt Developers: Route 31 Between Morgan Road and
Route 11 is Seen as County's Next Big Thing, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), July 7, 2002, at Bl.
131. Sylvester Ron, Farm's Plight Raises Uproar, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Mo.), Oct. 14,
1999, at 1A.
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manager as "protecting the tax base" and keeping "development closer
into the city." 132 The plan was later scrapped due to public opposition. 133
While agriculture can have significant environmental effects, 134
farmland is important for the preservation of biodiversity and maintenance
of open space. As areas once dominated by agriculture are developed,
farmland is increasingly important for migratory species. 135 Such land can
serve as wildlife "corridors" that offer "opportunities for emigration to
populate new patches ofhabitat.'' 136 Farmland's contribution-to biological
diversity is different from that of truly undeveloped land. Nonetheless,
"some agricultural areas with trees may protect as much biodiversity as
neighboring forests and provide other benefits necessary for proper
ecosystem functioning." 137 Due to a range of government incentive
programs and private conservation efforts, an increasing portion of
agricultural land is explicitly devoted to conservation purposes. 138
Identifying the extent to which eminent domain has been used against
forest land, farmland, or open space is difficult. There is no comprehensive
data on the use, let alone threatened use, of eminent domain. According to
one recent study, only a small fraction of government uses of eminent
domain are reported. 139 Nonetheless, eminent domain has regularly been

132. Jd.
133. Snyder Carmel Perez, Farm Bills Filter Through Legislature, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER
(Mo.), May 21,2000, at lB.
134. See Ralph E. Heimlich & William D. Anderson, Development at the Urban Fringe and
Beyond: Impacts on Agriculture and Rural Land, in AGRlC. ECON. REP. 803, at 3 (U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
2001) (not4Jg that environmental impacts of agriculture are "generally less severe than those from
urban development"); DAN IMHOFF, HABITAT AND FARMLANDS, http://www.biodiversitypartners.org/
habconserlfarm/03c.shtml ("massive-scale, industrial agriculture and development" has led to
"significant losses" for flora and fauna). This is not meant to minjn;rize the potential environmental
impacts of agriculture, which are typically greatest with so-called "factory farms" and large-scale,
intensive agricultural enterprises. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000).
135. KAREN BASSLER ET AL., BIODIVERSITY PROJECT, FARMLAND LOSS AT A GLANCE,
http://www.biodiversityproject.org/mediakit!Sprawl_IB_farmland_loss.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2006).
136. Jd.
137. Peter Bichier, Agroforestry and the Maintenance of Biodiversity, ACTIONBIOSCIENCE.ORG,
Apr. 2006, http://www.actionbioscience.org/biodiversitylbichier.html.
138. See Roger Claasen, Emphasis Shifts in U.S. Agri-Environmental Policy, f'\MBER WAVES,
Nov. 2003, http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/November03/pdf/emphasis.pdf (summarizing
federal incentive programs); U.S. Dep't of Agric., Land Use, Value and Management: Farmland
Protection (Feb. 28, 2006), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing!LandUse/farmlandprotchapter.htm
(summarizing public and private farinland protection programs).
139. See Dana Berliner, supra note 127, at 2 ("Many, if not most, private condemnations go
entirely unreported in public sources .... "). Connecticut is the only state that keeps records of the use
of eminent domain for redevelopment purposes. According to the Berliner study, fewer than six
percent of the uses of eminent domain were reported in news sources searchable through Lex.isNex.is.
Jd. at 8. Of course, it is possible that media coverage of proposed and actual condemnations will
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used or threatened as a means to promote economic development at the
expense of agricultural lands, conservation lands, and open space. 140 More
importantly, there are reasons to believe that the frequency of such takings
will increase in the future as metropolitan areas and their suburbs expand
into the surrounding countryside and local governments look for new ways
. b sand.mcrease t herr
. tax b ase. 141
to create JO
The economic development rationale could be used to justify
condemnation of almost any property. 142 Property owned by nonprofit
institutions is at special risk, however. Since nonprofit institutions do not
pay property taxes, the condemning authority can always argue that tax
revenue will increase if their property is transferred to a for-profit
business. Moreover, many nonprofit institutions are likely to employ fewer·
people and generate less economic activity than do profit-making
enterprises, further exacerbating their vulnerability. Economic
development takings may also come at the expense of historic preserv-ation
if historic buildings are located in areas targeted for condemnation. 143
Environmental trusts are particularly disadvantaged. Since these
organizations generally seek to keep their property in its pristine natural
state, they are unlikely to use their land to employ significant n~bers of
people or engage in productive economic activity. Even prior to·the Kelo
decision-and the resulting media attention to the issue-land trusts
identified eminent domain as a threat to private land conservation. In a
December 2004 survey conducted by the Land Trust Alliance, eminent
domain and condemnation were cited as reasons why land currently
conserved by land trusts might not be protected in the future. 144 As one
park board member observed, "if you put a conservation easement on the
land and you prevent development on the property, there's nothing to

increase as a result of the controversy generated by the Kelo decision. However, it seems unlikely that
any such increase in media attention will be permanent, as both the public and reporters are likely to
move on to other issues a:s time goes on.
140. See supra notes 117-33 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
142. See Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1009-10, 1021-22.
143. See Berliner, supra note 127, at 83-84 (discussing controversy over use of eminent domain
to condemn historic Lyric Theater in Lexington, Kentucky); Danielle McNamara, Council OK.s
Redeveloping Downtown Pittsburg, CONTRA COSTA TIMEs, Nov. 8, 2005, at A03 (historic building to
be condemned as part of downtown eminent domain plan); Christine Pelisek, Blight Makes Right?,
L.A. WEEKLY, July l, 2005, at 15 (eminent domain threatened against several historic businesses).
144. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND TRUST RESPONSE QUESTIONNAIRE: SURVEY OF LAND
TRUSTS CONDUCTED FROM DECEMBER 2, 2004--JANUARY 14, 2005 (Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.lta.
org/sp/survey_results.htrn.
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prevent a future county commission . . . from reclaiming that property
through eminent domain." 145
The risk to environmental conservation on private land is significant,
particularly due to the extent of such conservation. Since the creation of
the first land trusts over 100 years ago, environmental trusts have
purchased land, easements, or other property interests to protect the land
from development or overuse. 146 As both the demand for environmental
conservation andpressurt?s for development on-environmentally-sensitive
lands have increased, so- too has the use of environmental trusts. 147 The
number of land trusts in the United States rose from under sixty in 1950 to
over 1200 in 2000. 148 In 2004, the Land Trust Alliance reported that there
were some 1500 local and regional land trusts around the country. 149 This
growth in land trust activity has been fueled by an increased demand for
environmental conservation and legal developments that facilitate and
encourage the purchase of conservation easements. 150
The 2003 Land Trust Census conducted by the Land Trust Alliance
found that local and regional land trusts own some 1.4 million acres of
land and conserved an additional five million acres through conservation
easements and other voluntary agreements. 151 From 1998 to 2003, the
amount of land protected by conservation easements more than tripled. 152
These figures exclude lands protected by national conservation
organizations, such as Ducks Unlimited and The Nature Conservancy. 153

145. Jody Callahan, Should Shelby Farms Be a Cash Cow? Debate Rages on Use of Property
Along Germantown Parkway, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Sept. 22, 2002, at AI (quoting Ron Terry, board
member of Shelby Farms Park who proposed adoption of conservation easements to protect the park
from development).
146. Parker, supra note 111, at 486. See also RlCHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND
TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003).
147. McLaughlin, Role ofLand Trusts, supra note 113, at 453 ("Over the past two decades there
has been an explosion in both the use of conservation easements as a private land conservation tool
and the number of private nonprofit organizations, typically referred to as 'land trusts,' that acquire
-:easements.").
148. Parker, s~pra note Ill, at 487-89; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward
a Greater Private Role, 21 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 245, 254 (2002) (citing Land Trust Alliance 1998
Conservation Directory listing over 1200 land trusts).
149. See LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS (Aug. 9, 2006),
http://www.lta.org/census/ [hereinafter LAND TRUST CENSUS].
150. Parker, supra note 111, at 489-96.
151. See LAND TRUST CENSUS, supra note 149. An additional 2.8 million acres were protected by
transferring the land to government entities, or protected through ownership or a conservation
easement. !d.
152. !d.
153. Parker, supra note 111, at 487 n.22. Some estimates place the total amount of land protected
by private conservation organizations at over 15 million acres nationwide. See MARY GRAHAM, THE
MORNING AFTER EARTH DAY: PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 99 (1999) (citing estimates of
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In some states, the amount of land protected is quite substantial. The
Vermont Land Trust, for example, protects over seven percent of the land
in the entire state of Vermont, mostly through conservation easements. 154
To fully measure the extent of private land conservation, and to
identify all those lands potentially threatened by eminent domain, one
would also have to account for the remaining privately owned, currently
undeveloped land. 155 For example, nearly sixty percent of America's
forests are privately owned, 156 and much of this land is managed, at least
in part, for conservation purposes. 157
Private land conservation is particularly important for wildlife
conservation. A significant portion of wildlife habitat is owned by farmers
and ranchers and is used for agricultural production. 158 Over three-fourths
of those species currently listed as threatened or endangered under the
Endangered Species Act 159 rely upon private land for some or all of their
habitat. 160 As John Turner, President of the Conservation Fund, observed,
"[n]o strategy to preserve the nation's overall biodiversity can hope to
succeed without the willing participation of private landowners." 161
The biodiversity so prevalent on private land is often located in areas
under significant pressure for development. While popular discussions of
biological diversity may focus on wilderness areas and habitats in farflung locales, the greatest threats to biodiversity occur where habitat

13 and 4. 7 million acres conserved by national and local organizations, respectively).
154. See David B. Ottaway & Joe Stephens, Land-Trust Boom a Boon for Habitat, WASH. POST,
Dec. 21, 2003, at A20.
155. See McLaughlin, Role of Land Trusts, supra note 113, at 466 ("Although lacking the 'flash
and glamour' associated with the protection of large parcels that have undeniable scenic or habitat
value, the ordinary parcels protected by land trusts constitute a significant portion of the national
landscape."); see also JOHN RANDOLPH, ENVIRONMENTAL LAND USE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
103 (2004) ("One of the most important categories of private land stewardship is those large blocks of·
roadless, natural land not currently in resource production. These are a de facto part of our nation's
conservation lands, but they are i10tP~I1Ilanelltly_protectf:d. ").
156. CONSTANCE BEST & LAURIE A. WAYBURN, AMERICA;S PRIVATE FORESTS: STATUS AND
STEWARDSHIP 3 (2001).
157. Substantial amounts of private timber land are managed for conservation purposes during
long cutting rotations. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPITALISTS:
DOING GOOD WHILE DOING WELL 4-8 (1997) (describing efforts to improve wildlife habitat and
recreation opportunities on land owned by International Paper).
158. See J. BISHOP GREWELL & CLAY J. LANDRY, ECOLOGICAL AGRARIAN: AGRICULTURE'S
FIRST EVOLUTION IN 10,000 YEARS 92 (2003) ("Three-quarters of the wildlife in the U.S. live on farm
and ranch lands.").
159. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
160. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES
PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS (1994).
161. John F. Turner and Jason C. Rylander, The Private Lands Challenge: Integrating
Biodiversity Conservation and Private Property, in PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: SAVING HABITATS, PROTECTING HOMES 92, 116 (Jason Shogren ed., 1998).
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disruption and modification is most prevalent. In fact, the number of
endangered species tends to be greatest near human development and other
activities. 162 Approximately sixty percent of imperiled plants and
animals 163 are found in metropolitan areas, and thirty-one percent of those
are found exclusively in such locations. 164 Indeed, there is increasing
recognition of the importance of biodiversity and ecological resources in
and around urban areas. 165
As privateland cons~rvation continues to increase and·metropolitan
areas grow, the potential for conflict will increase. Much land targeted by
.land trusts and other conservation groups for protection is located near
expanding metropolitan areas and sprawling suburbs. Nearly one-third of
the land protected by local and regional land trusts lies in the densely
populated Northeast. 166 In many cases, the reason for obtaining a
conservation · easement is to prevent or limit anticipated development.
These lands are likely to be among the first targeted by government
officials seeking to create room for suburban expansion or development
projects.
There are additional economic reasons why . conservation land,
farmland, and other open spaces may be particularly attractive to
developers. This land will often be less expensive than other property,
especially as compared to areas that are already developed. Property set
aside for agricultural use may also be assessed at a lower value for tax
purposes. 167 Thus, taking such land for economic development purposes
could provide a greater boost to local tax revenues than other available
parcels. 168
Because many conservation areas, farms, and the like are located on
larger land parcels, it will often be much easier to assemble large lots to

162. V. C. Radeloff et al., The Wildland-Urban lnteiface in the United States, 15 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 799, 803 (2005) ("[T]he number of endangered species tends to be higher where human
activities are more prevalent.").
163. REID EWING ET AL., NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, ENDANGERED BY SPRAWL: HOW RUNAWAY
DEVELOPMENT THREATENS AMERICA'S WILDLIFE 13 (2005). NatureServe identifies approximately
6400 U.S. species as imperiled or critically threatened; the U.S. Government's list of threatened or
endangered species numbers 1265.
164. /d. at 13.
165. See Alexander Stille, Wild Cities: It's a Jungle Out There, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,2002, at B7.
166. See LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2003 NATIONAL LA.ND TRUST CENSUS TABLES (NOV. 18, 2004),
http://www.lta.org/census/census_tables.htm.
167. In Pennsylvania, for example, agricultural land may be assessed for agricultural purposes
rather than at market value.
168. lfland is assessed at a lower value for a given use, such as agriculture, transferring that land
to another use with a higher tax assessment can increase tax revenue.
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facilitate larger development projects on such land. 169 The economic and
political costs of condemning a few farms will often be less than those of
seeking to relocate scores of homeowners from an inner-ring suburb.
Indeed, this is one of the reasons that some states have enacted statutes
imposing specific limits on the use of eminent domain against farmland. 170
The federal government also places additional administrative hurdles on
the taking of parks through eminent domain out of the recognition that
there are substantial incentives to use such land for many types of
development. 171 As the Supreme Court observed in Citizens of Overton
Park v. Volpe, governments seeking to assemble large parcels will often
prefer parkland to availabie alternatives. 172 Among other things, "since
people do not live or work in parks, if a highway is built on parkland no
one will have to leave his home or give up his business." 173 The same can
be said of much privately owned, undeveloped land.
.
Conservation easements, when acting alone, do not protect lands from
eminent domain; they can be extinguished by the use of eminent
domain. 174 In some jurisdictions, however, there are explicit limitations on
the use of eminent domain to take farmland or other properties covered by
conservation easements. 175 Where such statutory protections do not exist,
the existence of a conservation easement may actually make some
properties more vulnerable to economic development takings 176 by
lowering the assessed value of a land parcel, reducing the local tax base,
and making the parcel less expensive to acquire. 177 At the same time, the

169. See supra note 116.
170. See Much Ado About Kelo: Eminent Domain and Farmland Protection, E-News (Am.
Farmland Trust, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2005, http://www.farmlandinfo.org/documents/30393/
Kelo.pdf [hereinafter Much Ado About Kelo ].
171. See 23 U.S.C. § 138 (2000) (limiting the use of parkland and other open space for federally
funded highway projects).
172. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
173. /d.at412.
i 74:····Drnp~~•.supra note i 13, at 266 ("Eminent domain is always a threat to the protective capacity
of a conservation easement."); Rebekah Helen Pugh, Conservation Easements as an Effective Growth
Management Technique, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,556, 10,564 (2005) (conservation easements are
extinguished by eminent domain); AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, FACT SHEET: AGRICULTURAL
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, Oct. 2006, http://www.farmlandinfo.org/documents/27762/ACE_0610.pdf(same). Some commentators argue that it should be easier to extinguish conservation easements
when it is in the public interest. See Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A
Policy Analysis in the Context of Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 466
(1984).
175. See Much Ado About Kelo, supra note 170, at 2 (noting twelve states have laws limiting the
use of eminent domain against farmlands enrolled in agricultural districts).
176. See id. at 5.
177. !d. at 5 ("[E]asements could make land more vulnerable by reducing its value."); AMERICAN
FARMLAND TRUST, supra note 174 (same).
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holder of the conservation easement is likely to place a high subjective
value on keeping land in an undeveloped state. This suggests that the
owners of conservation lands may be less willing to negotiate the sale of
development rights, and more likely to be the sort of "holdouts" often used
to justify the use of eminent domain in the first place. This also suggests
that the owners of conservation easements are likely to feel
undercompensated when their property is taken, as it is likely that they
place a higher subjective-value on the land than the average owner-of an
equivalent plot of land.
Even if one concludes that the condemnation of conservation lands for
economic development has been relatively rare to date, there are reasons to
expect that the rate of such takings will increase in the future. Defenders of
eminent domain acknowledge that conservation easements "are already
under challenge in many places, and the social and legal pressure to
remove or modify easement restrictions will only increase as decades and
centuries pass." 178 In some communities with substantial amounts of
conservation activity, opposition to easements appears to be increasing. 179
Some communities dependent on resource extraction are also hostile to
land trust activity. 180
The proliferation of land trusts and conservation easements is a
relatively recent phenomenon. While the first private land trust was
established in 1891, 181 state statutes authorizing conservation easementsdid not become common until almost a century later. 182 Moreover, a large
percentage of the land protected by conservation easements is located in or
near densely populated areas where there is significant urban expansion.
This is no coincidence, as the threat of approaching development often
provides the impetus for the creation of a conservation easement, if not the
outright purchase of land by a local trust. As suburban boundaries expand,

178. John D. Echeverria, Revive the Legacy ofLand Use Controls, OPEN SPACE, Summer 2004, at
12. To Echeverria, the potential threat to the permanence of conservation easements is a reason to rely
more on government regulation. The authors, on the other hand, would prefer to reduce the threat by
limiting the use of eminent domain.
179. See, e.g., Massie! Ladron de Guevara, Colton Moves to Ease Fly-Habitat Constraints, PRESSENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Jan. 18, 2006, at B2.
180. For an illustration of this hostility, see Tim Findley, "Nature's Landlord": The Story of the
World's Most PowerfUl Environmental Group, The Nature Conservancy, RANGE, Spring 2003, at TNC
I (characterizing The Nature Conservancy as a "runaway predator" and a "monster'').
181. Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 113, at I 0224 (referring to the Trustees of Reservations
land trust, founded by Charles Norton Eliot in 1891).
182. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws did not draft the
Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) until 1981. Pugh, supra note 174, at 10,559; see also id.
at 10,558 (noting conservation easements have become popular since the 1980s).
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the pressure to develop the surrounding countryside will only increase. 183
Thus, in those states in which economic development takings are
permitted, conservation lands and open space will be under relatively
greater threat.
2. Lessons .from the Experiences of Religious Institutions

The vulnerability of property owned by nonprofits to economic
development takings is best documented in cases involving religious
institutions such as churches. Sixteen churches were destroyed as a result
of the notorious 1981 Poletown condemnations, which leveled a Detroit
neighborhood for the purpose of building a new General Motors factory. 184
More recent examples of economic development takings targeting
religious property include the attempted condemnation of a church in order
to build a Costco in Cypress, California; 185 condemnation of an Illinois
mosque for the purpose of building private rental housing; 186 and the
taking of an Indiana church for "redevelopment" by new private
oWners. 187 Even in the aftermath of Kelo, which has focused public
attention on eminent domain abuse, authorities in a small city near Tulsa
are proceeding with plans to condemn a small Baptist church in order to
"make way for superstores like ... Home Depot." 188 Similarly, the Hawaii
Supreme Court recently upheld the condemnation of church property in
Honolulu for the purpose of benefiting private condominium owners. 189
The Becket FUiid for Religious Liberty, a public interest law firm, has
compiled a list· of numerous other recent cases where economic
development condemnations have been used or threatened against
religious institutions. 190 As the Becket Fund amicus brief in Kelo argues:

183. See generally AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, FARMING ON THE EDGE: SPRAWLING
DEVELOPMENT THREATENS AMERICA'S BEST FARMLAND (2002), http://farmland.org/documents/
29393/Farming_On_The_Edge_2002.pdf.
.
184. ARMOND COHEN, POLETOWN, DETROIT: A CASE STUDY IN 'PUBLIC USE' AND
REINDUSTRIALIZATION 4 (1982).
185. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1225-29 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
186. Southwest TIL Dev. Auth. v. AI-Muhajinum, 744 N.E.2d 308 (111. App. Ct. 2001).
187. City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 2001).
188. Ralph Blumenthal, Humble Church is at Center of Debate on Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2006, at A14.
189. City and County of Honolulu v. Sherman, 129 P.3d 542 (Haw. 2006).
190. Brieffor Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v.
City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2787141. The list of cases cited
here and in the Becket Fund brief probably understates the true extent of the phenomenon because it is
based upon published decisions and press reports. Many condemnation actions do not result in a
published decision and/or are not covered by the press.
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Because religious institutions are overwhelmingly non-profit and
tax-exempt, they will generate less in tax revenues than virtually
any proposed commercial or residential use. Accordingly, when a
municipality considers what properties should be included under
condemnation plans designed to increase for-profit development
and increase taxable properties, the non-profit, tax-exempt property
of religious institutions will by definition always qualify and always
be vulnerable to seizure: 191
The Becket Fund's point applies with equal,· if not greater, force to
environmental nonprofits. They also generate less tax revenue than almost
any "commercial or residential use" properties and will "always be
vulnerable to sei.We" on economic development grounds. 192 In many, if
not most, instances, local and regional land trusts will lack the political
power that sometimes protects churches with large congregations against
the threat of eminent domain. 193 Whereas churches and other religious
institutions often have local congregations to protect their interests, land
trusts often lack an equivalent base of popular support. This may be
particularly true in the case of larger land trusts that lack local
memberships, some of which may be viewed as "absentee landlords" by
local residents. Many lands protected today, such as Hawk Mountain in
Pennsylvania, would not have been preserved if they were dependent upon
local political support. 194

3. The Possibility of Circumvention
One possible objection to our argument is that in most instances where
eminent domain is used to take undeveloped land, the condemnation
would be able to proceed under our proposed rule because it would satisfy
the requirements outlined by the Michigan Supreme Court in Hathcock. 195·

191. Jd. at 11.
192. ld. at 11 (emphasis omitted).
193. Some argue that churches are often able to protect themselves through the political process.
See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV.
101, 115-19. However, this is likely to be true only of churches with substantial influence over local
politics. Cf id. at I 15-17 (describing how the wealthy and locally powerful Catholic Church was able
to prevent some of its churches from being condemned in Chicago at a time when Catholics were a
majority of Chicago voters and ''both majoritarian and minoritarian forces favored ·church
preservation"). Religious institutions affiliated with poor or politically weak denominations are
unlikely to be equally successful.
·
194. See Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 113, at 387-94 (discussing the history of
Hawk Mountain).
195. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).

654

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

84:623

A ban on economic development takings can often be circumvented
through expansive interpretations of blight or other legal maneuvers. 196
For example, when California City took several thousand acres of land in
the Mojave Desert for the construction of a Hyundai facility and test track,
it did so by designating the property as blighted, even though it is difficult
to explain why an ecologically valuable desert should be considered
blighted. 197 The project, labeled a "poster child" for eminent domain abuse
by California's Attorney General, harmed local desert tortoise and Mojave
ground squirrel populations. 198 Similarly, a proposed landfill that
threatened the taking of portions of Duke Forest would likely have
qualified as a "public use," even though it threatened a precious natural
resource. 199 In jurisdictions that prohibit pure economic development
takings, there is pressure to generate blight designations that will pave the
dornam.
. 200
.
way fior other uses of emment
To be sure, a prohibition on economic development takings will not bar
all environmentally harmful uses of eminent domain. Environmentally
harmful takings which transfer land to government ownership would not
be prohibited. 201 In addition, a ban on economic development takings is
unlikely to be fully effective unless it is coupled with restrictions on the
defmition of blight which prevent blight designations from being applied
to virtually any property. 202 However, a ban on economic development
takings is almost certainly a necessary prerequisite to any judicial or
legislative _effort to limit the definition of blight. Property owners will
have little incentive to challenge expansive defmitions of blight, and

196. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
197. See Paul Shigley, Lawmakers Threaten to Diminish Eminent Domain Authority, CAL. PLAN.
& DEV. REP., Sept. 2005, at 5; Robert McClure, Displaced by Automobile Test Facility in California,
SEATTLE POST-lNTELLIGENCER, May 3, 2005, at W; Jim Herron Zamora, Lockyer Challenges Seizure
ofLand for Private Project, S.F. CHRON., July 27, 2005, at B8.
_
198. McClure, supra note 197, at W.
199. Monte Basgall, Seelnglhe ForiStjorlhe Trees; DDKE'REsEA.RcH: (2000--2001), available at
http://www.dukeresearch.duke.edu/database/pagemaker.cgi?992633500. In order to prevent the use of
eminent domain to take portions of Duke Forest, Duke entered into an agreement with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration that effectively preempted the pending condemnation. !d.
200. One of the most notorious recent examples of this sort of "blight abuse" occurred in
Lakewood, Ohio. In preparation to use eminent domain to clear a neighborhood for an upscale mixeduse development, local officials commissioned a blight study relying upon blight criteria broad enough
to encompass approximately ninety percent of all the homes in the city (including the horne of the
then-mayor). See Samuel R. Staley & John P. Blair, Eminent Domain, Private Property, and
Redevelopment_· An Economic Development Analysis, POL'Y STUDY 331 (Reason Public Policy
Institute, Los Angeles, CaL), Feb. 2005, available at http://www_reason.org/ps33l.pdf.
201. See supra Part I.B.l (explaining that a ban on economic development takings would not
prohibit condemnations that transfer property to public ownership).
202. Sornin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 89-91.
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judges little reason to strike them down, if the condemnation in question
could just as easily be defended using an economic development rationale.
Even without additional reforms, a ban on economic development
takings will prevent at least some exercises of eminent. domain that are
likely to have negative environmental effects. Not all states have
expansive definitions of blight, 203 and a ban on the economic development
rationale will have a larger impact in states with narrower blight
statutes. 204 -Furthermore; requll-ing-devtdopers and local governments to
obtain a blight designation before condemning environmentally valuable
land might increase the transaction costs of condemnation and thereby
deter some uses of eminent domain. 205 It is also possible that some
erroneous blight designations could be challenged successfully in court. 206
Finally, although the issue has not yet been litigated, it is possible that
some of the more extreme definitions of blight-such as those that define
it as essentially coextensive with supposedly insufficient economic
development 207-could be struck down as inconsistent with state
constitutional bans on economic development takings. Without any
comprehensive data on the use, and threatened use, of eminent domain, it
is impossible to determine exactly how much protection a ban on
economic development takings would provide. It is clear, however, that
such a ban would provide greater protection for environmental values than
what exists in its absence.
4. Eminent Domain and Urban Sprawl

Some environmental analysts and urban planners claim that eminent
domain is a powerful tool which can be used to protect conservation lands

203. See Luce, supra note 71 (surveying legal definitions of blight in every state).
204. Several states have narrowed their definitions of blight in the aftermath of Kelo. See Somin,
Limits ofBacklash, supra note 3, at 21-24.
205. For a more detailed discussion of such procedural constraints on eminent domain and their
limitations, see Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 37--40. For arguments that procedural protections
can have a major impact in limiting eminent domain abuse, see, e.g., Merrill, supra note 89, at 18;
David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Make Eminent Domain Fair for All, BoSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12,
2005, at Al4.
·
206. see, e.g., Sweetwater Valley Civic Ass'n v. Nat'! City, 555 P.2d 1099, 1103 {Cal. 1976)
(holding that property could not be taken under California's blight condemnation law merely because
"the area is not being put to its optimum use, or that the land is more valuable for other uses").
207. See, e.g., Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 13 (Nev. 2003)
("Economic blight involves downward trends in the business community, relocatio)l of existing
businesses outside of the community, business failures, and loss of sales or visitor volumes.").
Obviously, virtually all communities occasionally experience "downward trends in the business
community" and "business failures." Jd. at 13.
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and combat urban sprawl. 208 Jeff Finkle of the International Economic
Development Council, for example, warns that if cities cannot use eminent
domain for redevelopment, "the only land that will be developed is green
space on the edge of cities. " 209 The fear is that if the transactions costs of
assembling large lots for development are too high in urbanized areas,
developers will focus their efforts on rural lands. 210
There is some irony in the argument that eminent domain is a defense
against sprawl, as historically eminent domain has been used to promote
sprawl far more than to control it. 211 Many of the highways and
transportation projects that have facilitated the geographic expansion of
metropolitan areas and their suburbs were facilitated by condemnation. 212
Today eminent domain is more often used to limit suburban development,
but most of those takings do not rely upon the economic development
rationale. 213 As noted above, the limitations we propose do not prevent the
use of eminent domain to preserve open space or address environmental
contamination. 214 Therefore, the only remaining environmental objection
is that barring economic development takings would prevent the use of
·eminent domain for projects that would discourage sprawl by redeveloping
and densifying urban areas, and that such projects can be expected to yield
net environmental benefits in excess of the expected environmental costs
of economic development takings. Yet for the reasons discussed earlier, it

208. See supra note 89 and sources cited therein.
209. Quoted in Staley & Blair, supra note 200, at 8.
210. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Goods, the Bads, and the Ugly, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2005,
at 18 ("It is much easier to acquire large tracts of land by buying up green fields at the outer fringes of
urban areas.").
211. This tendency prompted the federal government to limit the. use of parkland for federally
funded highway projects. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question ds a Takings Problem, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 934, 952 (2003) (noting the construction of the interstate highway system was
"characterized by a massive exercise of the power of eminent domain that resulted in
...-overconsumption of private land''); Terry J. Tondro, Spra}ill and Its Enemies: -An Introductory
Discussion of Two Cities' Efforts to Control Sprawl, 34 CONN. L. REV. 511, 514 (2002) (noting the
construction of highway networks is one of the "usual suspects" blamed for sprawl because highways
"open up wide areas of open space to development").
Highways and roads themselves have direct environmental impacts, including habitat
fragmentation. See, e.g., Richard T.T. Forman, Estimate of the Area Affected Ecologically by the Road
System in the United States, 14 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 31 (2000) (discussing environmental effects
of roads); Stephen C. Trombulak & Christopher A. Frissell, Review of Ecological Effects of Roads on
Terrestrial and Aquatic Communities, 14 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 18 (2000) (same).
213. As noted supra Part I, limiting the use of eminent domain for economic development does
not prevent the use of eminent domain for the creation of parks, the preservation of open space, or the
adoption of zoning or other land-use controls.
214. See supra Part I.
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is questionable that even the most well-intended projects will produce
such results. 215
One potential use of eminent domain, which could limit urban sprawl,
would be to utilize it to promote denser redevelopment. Denser urban
development can produce significant environmental benefits by reducing
the footprint of human development on the countryside, among other
things. However, increased density can also produce environmental costs,
particularly if it resultsc~in more -intensive land use or the -loss of open
space. Replacing a low-density residential community along the Atlantic
Coast with a high-density commercial development, as has been proposed
in Florida's Riviera Beach, for example, is likely to have a significant
impact on the coastal environment. 216 Recent research shows that open
space within urban areas provides substantial Pl!blic benefits, as reflected
in local property values. 217 Using eminent domain to increase density at
the expense of such open space would not benefit many communities.
Theoretically, increased population density in urban settings should
reduce traffic congestion and air pollution. 218 In practice, however, the
exact opposite appears to occur. As population density increases, so too do
vehicle miles traveled and urban traffic congestion. 219 As a result, those
areas with the highest population densities have the worst urban air
pollution. 220 One reason for this is that increasing population density

215. See supra Part I.
216. See, e.g., Pat Beall, Eminent Domain Case Draws National Spotlight, PALM BEACH POST,
Dec. II, 2005, at lA; Joyce Howard Price, Florida City Considers Eminent Domain: Posh Project
Would Displace 6,000, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at AOI.
· 217. See Vicki Been & loan Voicu, The Effect of Community Gardens on Neighboring Property
Values (N.Y.U., Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-09, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_id=889113.
218. See, e.g., Kim Krisberg, Poor Air Quality, Pollution, Endanger Health of Children:
Designing Healthier Communities for Kids, NATION'S HEALTH, Mar. I, 2006, available at
http://www.apha.org/tnhlindex.cfin?fa=Print&id=2627.
219. See Randall G. Holcombe, The New Urbanism Versus the Market Process, 17 REV. OF
AUSTRIAN ECON. 285, 290 (2004) ("If traffic congestion is a problem, increasing population density
will add more traffic to already congested areas, making the problem worse."); see also Wendell Cox,
Coping with Traffic Congestion, in A GUIDE TO SMART GROWTH: SHATTERING MYTHS, PROVIDING
SOLUTIONS 41-42 (Jane S. Shaw & Ronald D. Utt eds., 2000) ("As urban density increases, so do
vehlcle miles traveled per square mile.").
220. See Kenneth Green, Air Quality, Density, and Environmental Degradation, in SMARTER
GROWTH: MARKET-BASED STRATEGIES FOR LAND-USE PLANNING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 79 (Randall
G. Holcombe & Samuel R. Staley eds., 2001) (citing data suggesting a correlation with density and
ambient air pollution); Holcombe, supra note 219, at 287-88 ("[T]he hlgher the population density, the
worse the environmental degradation in almost every dimension."); id. at 288 ("[P]ollution is the
hlghest where population density is the hlghest."); Randal O'Toole, ISTEA: A Poisonous Brew for
American Cities, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS No. 287, Nov. 5, 1997, at24 ("[I]n major U.S.
cities and metropolitan areas, smog problems are strongly correlated with population density. . . .
Cleaner air correlates with lower densities."); see also Heimlich & Anderson, supra note 134 (noting
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increases the number of vehicles on the road, even where mass transit is
available. 221 In addition, most vehicle emissions are higher when vehicles
are traveling at lower speeds, as they are likely to do in urban traffic
jams. 222 The point here is not to argue that dense redevelopment of city
cores and inner-ring suburbs is, on the whole, environmentally harmful.
Rather, the point is that dense urban redevelopment is not an unalloyed
environmental good. 223
Even if one assumes that most urban economic development projects
that rely upon eminent domain will produce net environmental benefits,
this does not mean that a, legal rule allowing for economic development
takings will likewise prove environmentally beneficial. If governments can
use eminent domain for economic development purposes, then it can be
_used for both good and ill. If cities and inner-ring suburbs are allowed to
use eminent domain to facilitate denser development, outlying
communities can use it to pave the way for greater suburban growth. The
same power which enables a city to redevelop an urban core enables a
S!lburb to replace open space with an industrial park or a strip mall. In this
way, eminent domain can be used to promote suburban sprawl and
metropolitan deconcentration, with all of its attendant social costs. 224 In
assessing the aggregate environmental impacts of economic development
takings, one must consider both the positive and negative uses of that
power. Barring the adoption of specific limits on the use of eminent
domain in particular areas, the permissive approach embodied in the Kelo
decision is likely to lead to greater environmental harm than the Hathcock
alternative.
B. Other Environmental Harms of Economic Development Takings
Economic development takings can contribute to environmental
degradation in less direct ways as well. Most clearly, they can be used to

air quality improvements from "decentralizing population and employment")221. See Cox, supra note 219, at 41-42.
222. See Cox, supra note 219, at 45_ This is true for emissions of carbon monoxide and volatile
organic compounds at speeds lower than fifty-five miles per hour. Nitrogen oxide emissions, on the
other hand, increase once average vehicle speeds rise above twenty miles per hour. Id. at 44.
223. It is also worth noting that the per capita cost of providing many public services may actually
increase with population density_ See Helen F. Ladd, Population Growth, Density and the Costs of
Providing Public Services, 29 URR STUD. 273, 292-93 (1992).
224. See generally JOSEPH PERSKY & WIM WIEWEL, WHEN CORPORATIONS LEAVE TOWN: THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF METROPOLITAN JOB SPRAWL (2000). Of course, some would argue that the
environmental and social costs of sprawl are exaggerated. See, e.g., A GUIDE TO SMART GROwrH:
SHATTERING MYTHS, PROVIDING SOLUTIONS, supra note 219; WILLIAM T. BOGART, DON'T CALL IT
SPRAWL (forthcoming); ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A HiSTORY (2005).
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facilitate unsustainable economic development and the establishment of
pollution-generating enterprises. Economic development takings operate
as a subsidy for economic development generally, and often for politically
powerful interest groups in particular. Such takings represent a subsidy to
development because, other things being equal, the use of eminent domain
reduces the costs of proceeding with a given development project for
dbvelopers. Absent the use of eminent domain, developers would have to
pay a higher-price to obtain desired properties, if they are· able to acquire
such properties at all. If development is subsidized in this fashion, there
will be more of it-and more of the resulting environmental effects,
ranging from air pollution and congestion to habitat loss and non-point
source water pollution. 225
There is also a danger that economic developmenr condemnations
might damage environmental quality by undermining property rights,
squandering public resources, and reducing communal wealth. Economic
development takings often lead to the establishment of enterprises that
could not have survived in a competitive market because they generate
226
less economic value than did preexisting land uses.
Since wealth and
income are among the strongest correlates of efforts to promote
environmental quality, economic development takings paradoxically
undermine environmental quality by dissipating wealth and reducing
economic growth.

1. Interest Group Capture of the Eminent Domain Process
When eminent domain is used for economic development, it is rarely
redevelopment solely overseen by disinterested urban
planners and "smart growth" advocates. The eminent domain process is
highly vulnerable to "capture" by narrow interest groups. 227 Particularly in
urban centers, redevelopment plans are the product of competing political
and economic pressures, including the desires of powerful interest groups

~public-spirited

225. See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, About Smart Growth, http://www.epa.
gov/dced/about_sg.htrn (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (describing environmental impacts of current
development patterns).
226. As already noted, eminent domain operates as a subsidy for economic development. This
means that the use of eminent domain will allow some projects to proceed that, otherwise, would not
have. Perhaps the paradigmatic exainple of economic development projects that fail to generate net
economic benefits are athletic arenas. See generally ROGER NOLL & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, SPORTS,
JOBS, AND TAXES: THE-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (1997) (summarizing
research. demonstrating public subsidies for sports do not generate net economic benefits).
227. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 8-23; Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7,
at 1010-24.
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and the need to enhance local tax revenue. For a variety of reasons, the
adoption of economic development takings is far more likely to be driven
by the political power of beneficiaries than by the prospect of
environmental or other public benefits. 228 Indeed, the bigger the project,
the more likely it is to be affected by special-interest power. The inevitable
political compromises limit the likelihood that redevelopment plans will
meet some theoretical environmental ideal. In some instances,
redevelopment plans are driven by the developers who will profit from the
project, and public needs are, at best, an afterthought. 229
2. The Costs of Economic Development Takings are Likely to Exceed
the Benefits

Economic development projects rarely produce the economic gains, or
any other gains for that matter, that their proponents allege. Therefore, it is
unlikely that economic development takings will generate sufficient
economic benefits to offset their environmental costs. The notorious
Poletown condemnations, for example, may actually have destroyed more
jobs than the development project created in its place. 230 The new GM
factory built as a result of the condemnations created less than half the
promised 6150 jobs, while the destruction of 150 to 600 businesses and
numerous nonprofit organizations may well have led to the loss of an
equal or greater number of positions. 231 When one factors in the $250
million in public funds expended on the project, and the economic cost of
destroying numerous homes, churches, businesses, and schools, it is highly
likely that the economic costs of the Poletown condemnations greatly
outweighed any benefits. 232 The same is true of the Kelo condemnations,
where some $80 billion in public funding has already been expended, with
little, if any, prospect of commensurate gains. 233
(

228. For a detailed discussion of the reasons, see Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 8-23;
Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1010-24.
229. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 8-23; Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7,
at 1010-24.
230. See Nicole Gelinas, They're Taking Away Your Property for What?, CITY J., Autumn 2005,
available at http://www.city-journal.org/htrnl/15_4_eminent_domain.html; Somin, Overcoming
Poletown, supra note 7, at 1012-13, 1017-18 (discussing conflicting estimates of job losses resulting
from Poletown ).
231. Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1017-18.
232. Id.
233. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 596-600 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J.,
dissenting), ajf'd 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (noting costs of project and low prospect of commensurate
benefits); Kate Moran, Developer Says Fort Trumbull Hotel Plan Not Viable Since 2002; Project
Became Unrealistic Without Pfizer Commitment, THE DAY (New London, Conn.), June 12, 2004, at
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These results are not accidental. There are several systematic reasons
why economic development takings are likely to generate costs that
exceed their benefits. First, none of the states that permit economic
development rakings require the new owners of condemned property to
actually produce the economic benefits that were used to justify
condemnation in the first place. 234 This, combined with the refusal of
courts in these states to consider the economic costs imposed by
condemnation projects-in-their~decisions; 235 gives local governments~and
developers strong incentives to oversell condemnation projects by using
inflated estimates of their benefits. In other cases, local officials promise
that projects will spur economic development without identifying what is
to be developed. 236
Second, the more economic development projects are subsidized
through the use of eminent domain, the more likely it is that inefficient
projects will proceed. As former Milwaukee mayor and president of the
Congress for New Urbanism John Norquist argued in his Kelo amicus
brief,' "speculative over-use of eminent domain may actually have a
chilling effect on the rigorous economic screening of projects naturally
bccurring in the private marketplace, and may result in an increased
number of unsustainable development projects." 237 If large eminent
domain projects fail to produce the job growth or tax revenues promised
by their proponents, why should one expect them to generate promised
environmental benefits?
Further, the costs and benefits of economic development takings are
extremely difficult for voters to determine; which ensures that officials
who approve inefficient development projects will rarely, if ever, be
punished at the ballot box. 238 Even in cases where it is possible for voters

C4 (discussing development project's lack of viability); William Yardley, After Eminent Domain
Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 2005, at AI.
234. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 10-15.
235. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 541 n.58 (refusing to consider costs imposed by condemnation because
"tbe balancing of tbe benefits and social costs of a particular project is uniquely a legislative
function"); Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 15~17 (describing failure to consider costs).
236. See, e.g., Krauter v. Lower Big Blue Nat. Res. Dist., 259 N.W.2d.472, 475-76 (Neb. 1977)
(striking down condemnation because tbere was no clear plan as to how tbe condemned property
would be used).
237. Brief for John Norquist, President, Congress for New Urbanism, as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, at 3, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108),
available at http://www.ij.org/pdf_folderprivate_property/kelo-norquist08.pdf; see also Gelinas, supra
note 230 ("In tbe free market, a poorly designed project will fail and be replaced by a well-designed
project-or just won't find private financing to get built. Witb government central planuing, illdesigned projects last forever-and tbey retard natural growtb around tbem.").
238. Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 19-21.
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to determine the costs and benefits accurately, any such accounting is
unlikely to be feasible until years after the fact, by which time many of the
officials who approved the condemnation are likely to be out of office. 239
In any event, by that point public attention will have moved on to other
issues.
Finally, the need to prevent "holdouts"-the standard· rationale for
economic development takings-can in most cases be addressed without
resort to eminent domain. If a private development project really will use
the property for purposes more valuable than those to which it is currently
devoted, the developers ca,n prevent holdouts from blocking the project by
240
using secret purchases or precommitment strategies.
Of course, where
conservation groups, or others, place a high subjective value .on
maintaining given lands in an undeveloped state, they should not be
considered holdouts. Such landowners are not engaged in strategic
behavior in order to maximize their compensation, but are rather "sincere
dissenters" from the merits of the development project who genuinely
v~lue the current uses of the land more than the developer values his or her
own projected uses. 241

3. Endangering the Environmental Benefits ofProperty Rights ·
Eminent domain is generally viewed as a threat to property rights, as
evidenced by the strong negative reaction to the Kelo decision by various
groups representing property owners. The rule ratified.· in Kelo is,
regardless of its other merits, less protective of property rights than that
urged by the Kelo dissenters and also adopted by the Michigan Supreme
Court in Hathcock. This, too, could have negative environmental
consequences insofar as it undermines the security of property rights on
the margin. Individuals are less likely to make investments in the longterm conservation of environmental resources on private land when they
2 2
are uncertain if their investments will bear
~
-.fruit.
.
International studies of economic and environmental trends
demonstrate that "environmental quality and economic growth rates are
greater in regimes where property rights are well defmed than in regimes
'
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239. !d.
240. For detailed explanations of the reasons why this is true, see Kelly, supra note 91; Somin,
Controlling, supra note 3, at 2 I-28.
241. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 23 (distinguishing strategic holdouts and: sincere
dissenters).
242. See Staley & Blair, supra note 200, at 2.
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where property rights are poorly defined." 243 The security of property
rights encourages owners to pursue the enhancement of their own
subjective value preferences, including both commercial and noncommercial values. 244 Property rights enable forest landowners to protect
their investment in planting trees or otherwise enhancing forest growth; 245
investments made by conservation groups in ecological protection and
restoration are also protected. 246 Conversely, a lack of property rights
provides substantiaL incentives to deplete valuable resources. 2t!7 Where
property rights are not secure, owners are less likely to invest in improving
or protecting a resource, and are more likely to consume it as quickly as
possible in a "tragedy of the commons" scenario. 248 On the margin, the
more purposes for which government authorities may exercise eminent
domain, the less secure private property rights will be.
4. Endangering the Environment by Reducing Societal Wealth

The history of condemnation for economic development raises further
concerns. As discussed above, economic development takings are more
likely to retard economic growth than enhance it. 249 Condemnations can

243. 'Seth W. Norton, Property Rights, the Environment, and Economic Well-Being, in· WHO
OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 37, 51 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998); see also Don
Coursey & Christopher Hartwell, Environmental and Public Health Outcomes: An International and
Historical Comparison (Harris Sch. Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 00.10, 2000), available at
http://www .harrisschool. uchicago.edu/aboutlpublications/working-papers/pdf/wp_00-1 0.pdf (finding
that, across the board, greater governmental regulation of private activity correlates with higher levels
of emissions and worse public health indicators).
' 244. See Louis De Alessi, Gains from Private Property: The Empirical Evidence, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 90, 108 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds.,
2003); see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REv. 347, 356
(1967) ("The development of private rights permits the owner to economize on the use of those
resources from which he has the right to exclude others."); Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of
the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife, I CATO J. 439, 456 (1981) ("Wherever
we have exclusive private ownership, whether it is organized around a profit-seeking or nonprofit
undertaking, there are incentives for the private owners to preserve the resource.").
245. See Jonathan H. Adler, Poplar Front: The Rebirth of America's Forests, in ECOLOGY,
LmERTY & PROPERTY 65, 71-72 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2000) (noting higher rates of forest growth
on private land than on federally owned forest land).
) 246. See Smith, supra note 244, at 456 (private ownership protects both for-profit and nonprofit
undertakings).
247. As Anthony Scott observes, "[n]o one will take the trouble to husband and maintain a
resource unless he has a reasonable certaint-y of receiving some portion of the product of his
management; that is, unless he has some property right in the yield." Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The
Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. EcoN. 116, 116 (1955). While it may be an overstatement to
claim that "no one" will act in such a manner, the marginal effect should be indisputable. !d.
248. For the classic analysis, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13,
1968, at 1243.
249. See supra Part ll.B.2 (explaining why the economic costs of development takings are likely
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increase the amount of development-for instance by creating an
industrial park or facilitating a given redevelopment project-but this is
not the same thing as increasing economic growth and societal wealth. In
some cases, economic development condemnations may provide the worst
of both worlds by increasing the amount of environmentally harmful
development while simultaneously retarding overall economic growth.
Economic development takings are unlikely to provide economic
benefits sufficient to offset the costs, environmental and otherwise. Insofar
as this is the case, using eminent domain for economic development
squanders scarce resources and retards the accumulation of societal
wealth. This, too, can have negative environmental effects of its own.
Wealthier societies have both the means and the desire to address a wider
array of environmental concerns. 250 Economic growth fuels technological
advances and generates the resources necessary to deploy new methods for
meeting human needs efficiently and effectively. 251 Public support for
environmental measures, both public and private, is correlated with
changes in personal income. 252 This is evidenced by the fact that donors to
environmental groups tend to have above-average incomes. 253 Empirical

to exceed the benefits); see also Gelinas, supra note 230 (discussing New Haven, Connecticut, as an
example of where redevelopment projects likely did more hahn than good);_ Thomas Garrett & Paul
Rothstein, The Taking of Prosperity: Kelo v. New London and the Economics of Eminent Domain,
REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Jan. 2007, at 4 (summarizing reasons why economic development takings are
likely to diminish prosperity rather than increase it).
250. See RICHARD L. STROUP, ECO-NOMICS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13-14 (2003); Jason Scott Johnston, On the Market for
Ecosystem Control, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. !29, 146 (2002) ("There is abundant evidence that the demand
for outdoor recreation and environmental amenities increases with national income."); Matthew E.
Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on
California Initiatives, 40 J.L. & EcoN. 137 (1997) (noting that most environmental goods are normal
goods for which demand rises with income); Patrick Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries
the Developing Countries?, 23 ENVTL. L. 705,706 (1993) ("[T]he demand for improved envii:onmental
quality tends to rise with income."); Kenneth E.. McConnell, Income and the Demand for
Environmental Quality, 2 ENVTL. & DEV. ECON. 383, 385-=86(1997Hrepoitiiig-on empirical evidence
on environmental Kuznets curve); Norton, supra note 243, at 45 (noting that, insofar as environmental
quality is viewed as a "good," consumption of environmental quality will increase as wealth
increases); Bruce Yandle et al., The Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Review of Findings, Methods,
and Policy Implications, PERC REs. STUD., Apr. 2004), http://www.perc.org/pdf/rs02_la.pdf.
251. See, e.g., AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY (1988) (providing extensive
arguments and evidence showing that increasing societal wealth produces environmental and safety
benefits).
252. Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners, Introduction: The Toxic Liability Problem: Why Is It
Too Large?, in CUTTING GREEN TAPE: TOXIC POLLUTANTS, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE
LAW 1, 15 (Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2000) ("Willingness to pay for environmental
measures ... is highly elastic with respect to income."). This is also true for charity in general. See
RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, WHAT WENT RIGHT IN THE 1980s 70 (1994) (noting that "[h]igher incomes
lead to increased giving").
253. Stroup & Meiners, supra note 252, at 15 (discussing 1992 reader survey for Sien·a magazine
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evidence also -suggests that wealthier communities are more likely to
support governmental efforts to preserve open space through the use of
bond issues and other local measures. 254 While the marginal effects of this
phenomenon may be small in any given case, the loss of societal wealth is
yet another negative environmental consequence that must be added to the
ledger when assessing the environmental impact of using eminent domain
for economic development.
CONCLUSION

From an environmental perspective, eminent domain is a two-edged
sword. It can be used to provide environmental public goods and preserve
undevelqped land. At the same time, however, it can also be used to
condemn farms, extinguish conservation easements, subsidize unsound
development, and pave the way for suburban expansion into the
countryside. Whatever the overall impact of eminent domain on the
enviro11Il!ent, it is clear that its use for economic development has
considerable environmental costs and few, if any, environmental benefits.
The economic development rationale is not needed to justify the use of
eminent domain for environmental protection. On the other hand, it can
be, and has been, used to justify condemnations that inflict environmental
harms. For this reason, the rule embodied by Kelo will result in
environmental harm.
As this Article goes to press, legislatures and local communities around
the country are considering efforts to reform or limit the use of eminent
domain. 255 Some thirty-five states have already adopted post-Kelo reform
laws. 256 Litigation over the constitutionality of economic development
takings also continues in state courts. 257 These efforts are largely
motivated by concerns about the equity and efficiency of eminent domain.

finding that members of the Sierra Club have an average household income more than double the U.S.
average).
254. See Matthew J. Ketchen & Shawn M. Powers, Explaining the Appearance and Success of
Voter Referenda for Open-Space Conservation, 52 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 373 (2006).
255. For a detailed list of post-Kelo reforms adopted so far, see Castle Coalition, Enacted
Legislation, http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/passedlindex.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007);
see also So:mirl, Limits ofBacklash, supra note 3, at 10-11.
256. Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3 (discussing reform in thirty-five states); CASTLE
COALITION, LEGISLATIVE ACTION SINCE KELO 1 (2007), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/
publications/State-Summary-Publication. pdf (listing thirty-four states, but not counting reform enacted
in Nevada). Unfortunately, most of the laws adopted so far are likely to be ineffective. See Sandefur,
supra note 3; Somin, Limits ofBacklash, supra note 3, at 11-22.
257. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs of Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639,642 (Okla.
2006) (post-Kelo decision banning economic development takings under state constitutional law).
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But the potential environmental consequences of eminent domain should
also be considered in these efforts. Prohibiting economic development
takings, as some states have already done, will not hamper ongoing efforts ,
to conserve environmental values. Similarly, states should adopt measures
to guard against the opportunistic use of blight designations and other
methods of circumventing the limits on eminent domain abuse; a
prohibition on economic development takings can only protect
undeveloped lands from eminent domain if it is diligently enforced.
During the debate over Kelo, few environmental advocates voiced
concerns about the. threat posed by economic development takings, and
some even claimed that the decision would advance the cause of
environmental protection. This is regrettable. Economic development
takings pose a significant threat to environmental quality, while providing
few if any environmental benefits.

